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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to show that Germany has to enhance its effort to 
integrate and transform national forces into European armed forces, while it 
retains the core values of democracy amid a growing emphasis on cultural and 
ideological conflict. Ultimately this thesis will develop a model that maps out the 
political consequences of transformation and puts it into an educational 
framework for practical application in the ranks of the German armed forces and 
possibly beyond. 
Above all, it is about the integration of different national military cultures 
and traditions that are based on different national ideas of soldiering as well as 
the altered meaning of soldierly service in the period since 1989.  However, when 
looking at the present day German armed forces, the lack of attention to cultural 
transformation is problematic. The neglect of the dimensions of society, politics 
and soldiers can cause a danger to the ongoing transformation of the 
Bundeswehr, not the least because of the problems of the past in German arms 
as well as the stresses and strains now faced by those armies most directly 
engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Taking the goals of the 
transformation of the Bundeswehr into account, this thesis will illustrate why the 
German armed forces still have to intensify their efforts for European military 
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
Based on cultural developments and the integration of the European 
Union, this thesis will explore the impact of these phenomena on security in the 
German armed forces, while taking into account the constraints of the process of 
transformation and the goals of the European Security Strategy.  The aim of this 
thesis is to show that Germany has to enhance its effort to integrate and 
transform national forces into European armed forces. Ultimately this thesis will 
develop a model that maps out the political consequences of transformation and 
puts it into an educational framework for practical application. 
This thesis is an attempt to find answers to the question of how to make 
"Transformation" an educational issue of the organizational culture of the 
German armed forces and how to implement these reforms within the process of 
training and education of same.  Above all, the present study is about the 
integration of different national military cultures and traditions which are based on 
different national concepts.  So far in the process of European integration, the 
cultural transformation of the military has been more or less ignored by scholars 
and theoreticians--even if transformation is conceived as transformation of all 
members of the Bundeswehr and of the overall organization.  However, when 
looking at the existing German armed forces, the lack of attention to cultural 
transformation is difficult to understand.  It will not be possible to provide a 
satisfactory orientation toward the future of the Bundeswehr by staying within the 
limits of the tensions between the structural levels and their interconnections; 
rather, the social level(s) in these organizations needs to be of paramount 
importance.  Taking the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr into 
account, and considering the necessity that military capabilities have to be 
adapted in order to meet the requirements of multinational operating 
 
2 
environment, this thesis will illustrate why the German armed forces still have to 
intensify their efforts for European military integration.1  
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
1. Main Question 
How should Germany respond to the cultural trends associated with the 
transformation of the Bundeswehr and security issues? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• What are the global cultural trends and their key variables? 
• How will these global trends affect German security? 
• What are the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr in the 
21st century? 
• How can the goals of the transformation of the Bundeswehr be 
turned into an educational issue for the organizational culture of the 
German Army? 
• How will the transformation of the German armed forces be 
influenced by the development of the EU (RMA2, equipment, 
training and organization), taking both threat assessment and 
cultural development into account? 
• What are the measures or models that have to be used in order to 
mitigate these trends? 
This thesis is based on multi-national security structures and 
multilateralism which follow a political rationale--a cornerstone of German 
security and defense policy as well as the organizational culture of the German 
armed forces for five decades3.  The principles symbolize the will and the 
capability of the allies and partners for concerted military action, which makes 
interoperability in its widest sense a decisive factor of the transformation process 
of the German military.  Multilateralism signifies more than just the establishment 
of technical, tactical and operational interoperability.  Rather, transformation also 
includes cultural development and multilateralism. Consequently, interoperability 
                                                 
1 Reiner K. Huber  (2002): “Armee der Zukunft: Trends und Folgerungen“, in: Europäische 
Sicherheit, 1/2002. 
2 Revolution of military affairs. 
3  Rolf Clement, et al,  50 Jahre Bundeswehr: 1955-2005 (Hamburg/Berlin, 2005);  Detlef 
Bald, Die Bundeswehr eine kritische Geschichte  (Munich, 2005).   
3 
extends beyond the sphere of tactical operational concepts and requires the 
setting of common standards, in such a wide strategic sense.  
The overall objectives for transformation of German armed forces should 
be military efficiency and optimization of benign social/cultural change (holistic 
transformation and/or future-oriented development). 
The criteria for the considerations of the thesis are the European members 
of NATO, especially those in favor of a unified Europe. This issue, however, has 
implications for the extension of the institutions of Euro-Atlantic command, 
leadership, morale and obedience to a wider sphere amid the present crisis, as 
well.  
The forging of a European military identity, then, should be an effective 
factor for bringing about the common will to secure a European confederation 
externally and internally.  In the context of transformation, education to a 
common will would be the cultural answer to a changed security environment 
(changed face of war, technology, inward orientation), parallel to technological, 
conceptual and structure-related answers.   
What is culturally significant is that many European NATO allies have for 
fifty years entertained an extensive security communications network, the 
interaction processes of which will be determined by the existing and future 
European tasks. However, despite a hesitant beginning in the era of the 
European Defense Community in the early-1950s, the allies have retained 
emphasis on particular national military principles and organizational culture in a 
way that may now, in the early 21st century, be ripe for change.  Significant in 
terms of learning is not only military operational readiness, but also the ideal and 
objective of "leadership and civic education" - the citizen in uniform or Innere 
Führung4 - the development of an awareness directed toward Europe as a whole.   
There is, however, the question of whether deepened military integration 
will entail concessions in the field of leadership and civil education. 
                                                 
4  The term Innere Führung cannot be translated into English. The best work on this idea in 
the English language is Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in 
the West German Armed Forces (Princeton, 1988).   
4 
According to Royl (1998), in the context of the cultural development 
considered here, identity and professionalism need to be functionally 
differentiated (regular military forces versus mercenaries).  The concept of 
leadership and civic education seems to be the proper context by which to 
approach this challenge in the spirit of the envisaged reform projects, as well as 
to deal with future questions in a productive manner. 
Moreover, the armed forces of most European nations are presently 
undergoing a transformation process, in order to meet the requirements 
according to the Defense Capability Initiative of NATO, or to the ESDP of the EU.  
However, this transformation process, affecting equipment, technology, training 
and organization issues, collides with government financial requirements as 
future budgets are expected to be more constrained. 
At the same time, this thesis will establish a link between education and 
the concept of leadership and civic education from a cultural perspective, to 
include the process of transformation, and present a model which will illustrate 
the development of a European military identity and intercultural competence.  
So, this thesis will argue that Germany has to enhance its cultural effort to 
integrate and transform its national forces into European armed forces. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Since 1990 the German armed forces have been in a situation where the 
cultural circumstances of the organization have radically changed and those 
forces do not know how far the reorganization will go, nor to what extent and in 
what way the developments so far will continue to retain validity for an 
operational force.  The Bundeswehr went from its cold war basis as an alliance 
army concentrated on the defense of central European NATO territory in the 
classical sense, to the extraordinary tasks of extending western ideals of security 
and defense in central and Eastern Europe via national unification.  Thereupon, 
the Bundeswehr reinvented itself as an army for crisis intervention beyond the 
geographical limits of its customary defensive mission.  
5 
The "Cold War" was the center of gravity which, until the year 1990, 
forged the European armed forces together.  This was the "guiding concept" at 
which the feasibility projections of the (inter-)national military met; it determined 
the way in which players were looked at. 
The transformation of a complex organization of armed forces now 
requires considerably more coordinated inter-organizational effort.  Particularities 
of the military mission and the size and diversity of the military organization mean 
that the identification of a modified (i.e., transformed) and "cultural" military 
capacity for performance and innovation, aimed at reducing complexity, clearly 
appear more difficult.  To narrow this broad topic, the analysis for Germany will 
concentrate on the German military in Europe. 
First this thesis will explore the implications for cultural trends such as 
values and religion.  In the next step, these cultural trends will be applied to a 
threat assessment, in order to define the new challenges for European and 
German national security. Then, the goals of the transformation of the 
Bundeswehr will be introduced.  Furthermore issues such as training and 
organization will be discussed. 
Following the requirements of mainly multinational units and multilateral 
operations, the impact on the transformation of the Bundeswehr will be analyzed.  
In particular, the relationship between the development of the EU and European 
military leadership will be discussed. 
In order to contrast the areas of tension, the next section will examine the 
impact of a declining Europe on the integration of cultural necessities in a military 
organization. 
Based on these results and constraints, the further development of 
German and European armed forces will be apparent.  Books and articles 
dealing with these issues support the argument.  In order to predict future cultural 
developments, reports and statistics of organizations such as the CSIS, EU, IMF, 
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II. CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT  
A. CULTURE 
First this chapter will explore cultural trends5 globally, focusing on Europe 
in order to clarify the different trends.  In the next step, these cultural trends will 
be applied to a threat assessment, in order to define the new challenges for 
European and German national security, specifically for the transformation of the 
German armed forces and the embedded concept Innere Führung. 
In the present globalized economy6, the traditional concept of culture, 
which equates cultures to homogenous ethnic groups and considers individuals 
to be totally embedded and enclosed in their cultures, is no longer valid.7  In the 
pre-modern concept, cultures were rigid and tightly closed constructs which 
permitted only clashes8 as intercultural encounters.  Today, such a concept is not 
only wrong, but also fateful and dangerous.  The cultures of today are rather like 
liquids that mix together and generate very different combinations, accentuations, 
lifestyles, ways of thinking and orientations.9 
Although cross-border cultural exchange and the change of cultures by 
external influences constitute no new phenomena, the various globalization 
processes have not only dramatically accelerated these tendencies, but also 
transformed them. 
                                                 
5  For the political meaning of culture as a term of art, see: Jacob Burckhardt, 
Wetlgeschichtekiche Betrachtubngen  (Stuttgart, 1955);  Jan Huizinga, Gesichcte und Kultur, 
(Stuttgart, 1954);  Norbert Elias, Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation (Frankfurt, 1997).   
6 Thomas Seibert,  (2000): “Das Ende der »humanitären Neutralität«.  Staatlichkeit, NROs 
und soziale Bewegung im globalisierten Kapitalismus“, in: ami, 30.  Jg., Nr.  5, Mai 2000. 
7 Pauline H. Baker, (2001): “Internal War.  Ethnic Conflict.  Failed States.  Small wars.  
Genocide.  Ethnic cleansing.  The Coming Anarchy.” in: The FfP Quarterly, Vol.  I, No.  1, April 
2001, Washington D.C., S.  1 u. 7. 
8 Samuel Huntington (2001): “Nein, kein Kampf der Kulturen”, Interview in: Die Zeit 66/2001, 
retrieved 5/18/06 from www.zeit.de/2001/66/Politik/200166_s-huntington_int.html. 
9 Wolfgang Thierse: Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen in einer globalen Gesellschaft.  
Risiken, Gefährdungen, Perspektiven.  Eine Ermutigung.  In: Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen 
in einer globalen Gesellschaft : Congress of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung on 3 February 1999 in 
Berlin / Akademie der Politischen Bildung.  Bonn, 1999.  Retrieved 5/27/06 from  
http://www.fes.de/fulltext/akademie/00652002.htm#E9E3 [last accessed 4 June 2006], see also 
Global Trends 2002, op.  cit., p.  138f.  
8 
The exchange between societies--which may be located far away from 
one another--is much more intensive than ever before; due to modern mass and 
communication media, cultural changes proceed much faster and in part more 
homogenously than in former centuries.10 
The core of cultural globalization is the global establishment of capitalism 
with its values determined by Zweckrationalität (instrumental reason) as a 
cultural system. 
At the same time, value systems like human rights or global environmental 
protection are not only made known, but also forced on a number of reluctant 
societies and their leaders.11  Apart from its economically determined facts, this 
variant of globalization thus leads to a change of civilization time and again.12 
Cultural globalization also means that, beyond the level of cultural 
differences, a new and additional global level of cultural community is developing 
or has already developed, one which has to be considered in the context of 
transformation--also in the meaning of transformation of the concept of “Innere 
Führung”.13  This concept represents the intention to transfer rules of the society 
and values of the constitutional law into the German military.   
Further, it means an exchange and interaction of this global level with 
cultures at local, regional and national levels.  In this sense, the existence of a 
"global culture" can hardly be denied any longer, although its exact form and 
significance may continue to be disputed.14 
The known symptoms are, for example: the standardization of 
consumption patterns (e.g., regarding soft drinks, fast food, and fashions), the 
                                                 
10 Global Trends 2002, op.  cit., p.  135. 
11 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1993): “Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen 
und nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik“, Teil B Band 1 – 3 / Teil C Band 1 – 12, Ebenhausen. 
12 Cf.  ibid, pp.  146f and 150. 
13 Joachim Krause (2002): “Komplexität heutiger Sicherheitspolitik", Vortrag auf dem 
Workshop "Szenariotechnik – Zukunftsforschung und strategische Sicherheitspolitik" am 27-28.  
Mai 2002 in Waldbröl. 
14 Weltbevölkerungsbericht 2005. Retrieved 6/2/06 from www.dsw-
online.de/kopf1/wbbericht/b_wbb2001_1.html. 
9 
globalization of mass communication (e.g., in the form of worldwide satellite 
television or the internet), and the "westernization" of music and other arts on the 
one hand and the simultaneous adaptation of foreign cultural elements in 
western art and popular culture on the other hand. 
The fact that people in different societies with very different traditions 
increasingly listen to the same musicians, drive--or at least would like to drive--
the same cars, and watch the same soap operas is both an economic and a 
cultural fact.  TV and music are indeed highly lucrative economic assets and 
export products.  
In addition to local and national cultures, a world culture seems to be 
developing that has a complex interrelationship with the local and national levels, 
but does not simply replace them.15 Depending on the point of view, this 
tendency is perceived as 'global village' or cultural imperialism. 
The word globalization underlines how much centrality and decentrality 
complement each other today and form a unified whole without excluding each 
other.16  
Fundamentalist movements in all religions and cultures of the world 
vehemently resist the advances of the modernizing civilization and the real or 
supposed threats posed to their own cultural traditions by cultural globalization.17 
Fundamentalism is a paradox attempt to combat the cultural 
foundations of the modern age, i.e. pluralism and rationality, human 
rights, tolerance, openness and differentiation, with the means of 
modern organization, communication and weapons technology.18 
                                                 
15 Weltbevölkerungsbericht, p. 142-145. 
16 Ibid., p. 189. 
17 Central Intelligence Agency  (2000): “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future 
With Nongovernment Experts”, Dezember 2000, Langley. Retrieved 5/27/06 from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html 
18  In Huntington. Harvard-political scientist Samuel Huntington put forward the theory that 
the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the fault lines between different 
civilizations and culture groups.  In his opinion, there is the danger of a struggle between the 
seven world cultures that each concentrate around one core state.  America is the core state of 
the Western world. Retrieved 5/18/06 from www.zeit.de/2001/66/Politik/200166_s-
huntington_int.html 
10 
As long as major ideologies (e.g.,  liberalism, socialism, communism and 
conservatism) meant hope and identification as sociopolitical projects and value-
oriented political lifestyles to many people in our and numerous other societies in 
the world, culture and religion only seemed to play a minor role in public life.  As 
the importance of these ideologies has faded, cultural and religious differences 
stand out more clearly as distinguishing features of groups and societies.  The 
membership of ethnic, religious and cultural groups perhaps offers the last 
"natural" possibilities of collective identification and mobilization.19 
Cultural factors will therefore play a growing role in international politics, 
since common agreement on desirable value-oriented objectives on the one 
hand requires intercultural dialogue. 
On the other hand, these objectives are also determined by cultural forces 
and do not only result from practical necessities.20 
B. VALUES 
German soldiers and civilians have debated for decades the meanings of 
both the ideal and the practical applications of “Innere Führung21”.  This 
exchange will be depicted in a detailed way in Chapter IV. In the context of 
cultural development and transformation, consequently, the implications of 
values will also be briefly introduced. 
During socialization, values are acquired as abstract guidelines of human 
behavior.22  In concrete situations, they control the individual's perceptions, 
decisions and actions as object-related attitudes.  A requirement for continued 
existence of a society is a minimum consensus on the values underlying the 
behavior of its members.  In the long term, value systems are subject to gradual 
changes that gain acceptance in several phases.  The phenomenon of non-
simultaneousness is also noted here.  The decisive phase in the current change 
                                                 
19 Huntington, Samuel. 
20 Global Trends 2002, op.  cit., p.  215. 
21 See Abenheim, cited above.  More recently see:  Paul Klein et al.  Die Zukuenftige 
Wehrstruktur der Bundeswehr  (Baden-Baden, 1997).  
22 Jean Callaghan and Jürgen Kuhlmann, (Hrsg.) (2000): “The Military and Society in 21st 
Century Europe.  A Comparative Analysis”, Piscataway. 
11 
of values in Germany was the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.  The 
term change of values, however, is misleading, because it is not the values 
themselves that change, but the meaning attributed to them.  There was a trend 
toward a decline of duty and acceptance of values23, and a rise of self-
development values24. 
At the individual level, very different combinations of values have 
developed. 
The phenomenon of an increase in the cosmos of values within a society 
is therefore better described by the term value pluralism.  According to Helmut 
Klages, the members of a society who combine the "good properties" of both the 
duty and acceptance values with the self-development values into a "synthesis of 
values" constitute the most interesting "human potential of a productive and 
progressive future development".25 
One aspect of value pluralism is the trend toward individualism, which 
describes a trend toward the development of progressive individual self-
determination. 
These shifts of value systems from disciplinary, self-denying and 
performance-oriented norms of the industrial society toward individual self-
realization and quality of life are only one component of a major cultural change 
of structure.26 
The increasingly apparent shift from adherence to ethical standards, 
hitherto considered binding, toward unconcerned pragmatism and sometimes 
                                                 
23 Self-restraint and self-control: Reference to society: discipline, obedience, sense of duty, 
loyalty, subordination, diligence, modesty; reference to the individual self: self-constraint, 
selflessness, forbearance, compliance, abstinence.  According to: Helmut Klages: Wertewandel 
oder Wertepluralismus? Von Pflicht- und Akzeptanzwerten zu Selbstentfaltungswerte. Retrieved 
5/10/06 from http://www.orga.uni-sb.de/lehre/seminar/9798/Daniela/danys_KK/wertewow.htm. 
24 Self-development: Reference to society: IDEALISM: emancipation, autonomy, democracy, 
participation, equality, equal treatment; reference to the individual self: hedonism: pleasure, 
excitement, variety; INDIVIDUALISM: self-realization, creativity, spontaneity, freedom.  According 
to: Klages. 
25 Klages.  
26 Chancen und Risiken der offenen Informationsgesellschaft. Retrieved from http://www.e-
demokratie.at/kapitel3.html.  
12 
hedonism also threatens the functional capability of the successful model of the 
social market economy.27  As far as Germany is concerned, the objective of a 
more efficient and humane society can hardly be achieved if the trend toward 
passing on any tasks and problems to government authorities, associations and 
organizations continues. 
Our structures are weakened due to the accelerating replacement of the 
consensus of values by value pluralism and the dwindling control function of 
values with regard to behavior.  A finding by Adam Smith thus becomes relevant 
to the present situation again: “Values can only be realized, if the respective 
actors can expect advantages for themselves.”28 
In this sense, the long-term critical dialogue concerning the 
implementation of human rights may be effective, since many governments can 
not afford in the long run to be criticized and to lose legitimacy in the eyes of their 
own population and the international public.  Violations of human rights also 
affect the image of transnational combines and consequently business as well.29 
The asynchronism of the civilization process also leads to different value 
preferences of the actors involved that first must be recognized and understood, 
before a joint balancing of interests may be considered. 
C. RELIGION30 
The share of atheists (who reject God consciously) and non-religious 
people (who are not interested in religion) declined from 18.9% to 15.1% of the 
world population between 1970 and 2001.  A further reduction to 13.4% is 
expected by 2025.  The percentages of Christians (33%), Hindus (13%) and 
Buddhists (6%) have remained relatively constant.  The share of Islam is 
                                                 
27 Kiehl, Dieter Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft? Nach dem Ende des Wertekonsens.  Das 
Parlament No.  8 / 16.02.2001. Retrieved 5/25/06 from http://www.das-parlament.de/08-
2001/aktuelle_ausgabe/p-a-54.html.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Global Trends 2002, op.  cit., p. 167. 
30  see Burckhardt and Huntington (2001): “Nein, kein Kampf der Kulturen“, Interview in: Die 
Zeit 66/2001. Retrieved 5/18/06 from www.zeit.de/2001/66/Politik/200166_s-huntington_int.html. 
13 
expected to continue to soar: 1970 - 15%, 2001 - 19.8%, 2025 - 22.8%."31 Islam 
thus constitutes the second-largest religious community in the world.  Of the 
around 1.2 billion Muslims, 0.3% live in North America, 0.1% in Latin America, 
1.3% in Europe, 28.6% in Africa, 4% in the former Soviet Union, 65.6% in Asia 
and 20% in other regions of the world.  More and more people convert to Islam.  
It is actually "booming". 
The very high population growth32 among Muslims must be kept in mind 
as one of the reasons for the expansion of Islam. 
The demographic trend in the Islamic nations33 thus constitutes an 
immense potential for further spreading of the Islamic faith.34  While the share of 
children in Western nations is steadily decreasing, they make up between 40% 
and 50% of the national populations in North Africa and West Asia. 
In the debate on the role of Islam in the events of 11 September 2001, 
four explanation patterns can be distinguished.35 
In the xenophobic explanation, Islam as a whole is suspect.36  National, 
regional, cultural and theological differences are either unknown or ignored.  
Islam is considered to be a global threat to Euro-Atlantic civilization37; terrorism is 
only the spearhead of mortal danger from the Middle East, accompanied by a 
"fifth column" (i.e., the Muslims in Europe).  Every Muslim thus becomes a 
security risk. 
                                                 
31 According to D.B.  Barrett and T.M.  Johnson, lt.  IDEA-Sp.  7'00/2,11. Retrieved 5/15/06 
from  http://www.bak-punkt.de/archiv/204.htm. 
32 Statistics retrieved 5/15/06 from http://religion.orf.at/tv/lexikon/le_islam_heute.htm.  
33 Johannes Kandel (2002): “Islam und Muslime in Deutschland", in: Internationale Politik 
und Gesellschaft Online, International Politics and Society 1/2002. Retrieved 5/18/06 from 
http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/folder/ipg/ipg1_2002/artkandel.htm. 
34 Weltbevölkerungsbericht 2001. Retrieved 3/2/04 from www.dsw-
online.de/kopf1/wbbericht/b_wbb2001_1.html. 
35 U.  S.  Center for Research & Education on Strategy & Technology - US-CREST (Hrsg.) 
(2000): “Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability”, Report of a 
French-German-UK-US Working Group, Arlington. Retrieved 4/22/06 from 
www.uscrest.org/finalrep.pdf. 
36 Huntington.  
37 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Hrsg.) (1999): “Globalisierung – Informationen zur 
politischen Bildung, Heft 263“, München. 
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In the pragmatic-political explanation, the assassins are described as 
political extremists and psychopaths.  A distinction is made between the 
extremist political ideology of "Islamism" and Islam as a religion. 
The forces of "Islamism" are fighting against "westernization".  The 
relationship between Islam and Islamism is usually not made a subject of 
discussion.  The terrorists are primarily anti-Americans and anti-globalists.  They 
feel chosen to counter "global capitalism" as the main enemy of mankind.  The 
leading nation of this capitalism is the United States who–in the terrorists' 
perception–is responsible for the misery in the Third World–in particular the mass 
impoverishment in Arabia–and support for Israel.  The strong attachment of the 
assassins to their religion is explained in terms of individual or social psychology 
and referred to as insanity. 
In the enlightened-secularist explanation, religion becomes the driving 
force of evil--it always contains substance for aggression and violence and even 
drives humans to make martyrs of themselves, the peak of religious insanity.  
Religion thus becomes a security risk for the secular, "enlightened" Western 
world.  In particular, Islam offers Islamists and terrorists a wealth of starting-
points and legitimations for their totalitarian ideologies. 
According to the degeneration-related explanation, the terrorist have 
terribly exploited and violated Islam and thus separated from the faithful (umma).  
Consequently, they are no Muslims, but nihilists from a religious point of view.  
When they refer to the Koran, they take its passages out of context and distort 
their meaning. 
There are authentic basic truths of faith shared by all Muslims in the world, 
according to which Islam is substantially a peaceful religion.  Islam means 
commitment to peace, justice and the welfare of mankind.38  In this explanation 
pattern, too, "Islamism" as an extremist political ideology is distinguished from 
Islam as a religion.  Islamism is thus a degeneration of Islam; it uses the religion 
                                                 
38 Maximilian Benner (2000): “Weltpolitik im 21.  Jahrhundert – Eine außenpolitische 
Diskussionsgrundlage.” Retrieved 6/2/06 from 
www.homepages.compuserve.de/MaximilianK2000/ weltpolitik21.htm. 
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cynically for political purposes.  This thesis can now be considered to be 
generally accepted.  The question is what religious interpretation patterns and 
theological conceptions, used by what groups and persons, permit a legitimation 
of violence and under what historical conditions such legitimation patterns are 
activated by some people. 
All religions have their "dark side", but the conditions under which this side 
is revived are very different.39  A generalization of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Sikhism or modern destructive psycho-cults is not possible.40  Instead, 
the various religions must be viewed in a differentiating manner to identify 
religious contents that can be used to instrumentalize and justify violence.  In 
order to emphasize the fundamental peaceability of world religions, their leading 
representatives met in Assisi on 24 January 2002 and adopted a Decalogue for 
Peace.41 Under economic and social pressure in times of upheaval, with growing 
social polarization and discrimination, many people find support and consolation 
in their traditional religion.42 The danger of an increase in radical tendencies also 
grows with this development. 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURAL TRENDS FOR SECURITY 
It is a matter of debate whether groups or leaders refer to religious and 
cultural differences in a conflict in order to gain advantages for their own 
interests, or whether religions and cultures inherently promote conflicts, because 
they lack the essential basis for understanding.  The world view created by the 
US political scientist Samuel Huntington, according to which an unavoidable 
cultural struggle within and between societies is to determine the fate of the 21st 
century, is about to become a new ideology in the period after the end of the 
East-West conflict. The theory has been adopted by groups throughout the world, 
                                                 
39 Werner Ruf (1998): “Zur Privatisierung von Gewalt", gekürzte Version eines Vortrages von 
1998. Retrieved 4/10/06 from www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/frieden/science/ruf-gewalt.html. 
40 Ian Pearson (Hrsg.) (1998): “Der Fischer Atlas Zukunft”, Frankfurt/M. 
41 At the meeting in Assisi, representatives of twelve religions and 31 Christian churches and 
communities declared their desire for peace and justice.  In addition, they condemned war, 
terrorism and violence committed in the name of religion.  See: Terror und Gewalt widersprechen 
dem Geist der Religion, in: Die Tagespost No.  29, 7 March 2002, p.  6.  
42 Kandel.  
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and is increasingly used to justify and confirm culturally supported political power 
strategies.43  But also the work in multinational units and particularly the 
necessary training for them is mainly effected by these trends.44   
Taking the goals of the European Security and Defense Policy45 into 
consideration, the same argument works for the German military.  Huntington46 
himself does not regard 11 September as an indicator for a clash of civilizations.  
He presumes that a clash of civilizations can and must be prevented by 
cooperation.  Moreover it is the aim of Innere Führung, to establish the 
democratic governmental and social standards within the German armed 
forces.47  As a consequence of this goal there are domestic military, domestic 
social and international implications of the global cultural developments. 
In all parts of the world--in the developing countries as well as in the post-
communist societies of Eastern Europe, but also in the democratic societies of 
the northern world– various political actors seek to instrumentalize cultural 
differences for political goals of differing effect, often in a negative sense.  Ethnic, 
religious and cultural affiliations are exploited to polarize groups. 
In the disruptions of modernization, in particular if the threat of social 
decline, cultural uncertainty, economic hopelessness and failure of corrupt 
political elites coincide, many people consider political fundamentalism to be the 
only promising way of solving their existential problems.48  
                                                 
43 In an essay published in the summer of 1993, Harvard-political scientist Samuel 
Huntington put forward the theory that the most important conflicts of the future will occur along 
the fault lines between different civilizations and culture groups.  In his opinion, there is the 
danger of a struggle between the seven world cultures that each concentrates around one core 
state.  America is the core state of the Western world. 
44 Hans G. Ehrhardt (2002): “Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik.  
Positionen, Perzeptionen, Probleme, Perspektiven”, in: Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, Bd.  142, 
Baden Baden. 
45 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fü S III 2 (2002): “Mit der ESVP zur europäischen 
Armee.  Visionäre Ansätze zur Implementierung einer vitalen und leistungsfähigen ESVP,” Berlin. 
46 Huntington. 
47 Jürgen Kuhlmann and David R. Segal (1994): “Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third 
Millennium”, in: Forum International, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München. 
48 Wolfgang Thierse, op.  cit. 
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The fundamentalist "revolt against modernism" is thus mainly nourished 
by development crises and social frustrations that cannot be countered 
effectively with weapons.  The "holy war" requires concepts of enemies that are 
presented in a religious context but have political, social and cultural-
psychological backgrounds.49  
As a central political task, it is necessary to ensure that the cultural 
change continues to be bearable, controllable, open to discussion and reactive to 
the political wishes of the people, in consideration of the globalization processes.  
General Graf von Baudissin50, the chief and “father” of the Innere Führung, 
already established this concept particularly within a European-Atlantic frame.51 
Today it is even more important to develop effective political, cultural and 
religious alternative programs to militant fundamentalism: a modernization that is 
more than a "secularization" by which traditions are destroyed.52 By globalizing 
knowledge, scientific and technological developments accelerate secularization.  
Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, however, reject negative modernization effects 
of secularization (such as materialism or consumerism).  It therefore remains 
questionable how far a process of secularization can proceed without conflicts. 
In sum, cultures or religions are not at war with one another.53  They are 
used as a political weapon in international power struggles and as an instrument 




                                                 
49 Reiner K. Huber (2001): “Die Erneuerung der Bundeswehr: Anfang eines weitergehenden 
Umbauprozesses?” in: Europäische Sicherheit 4/2001, S.  25 – 29. 
50  On Baudissin and his ideas, see Abenheim cited above.  The context of the original 
German reform of soldier and politics as well as changed social setting unfolded in the Europe of 
the early 1950s. This era also saw the failed attempt to create the European Defense Community, 
with its mixture of western and central European military institutions.  
51 Huber: “Armee der Zukunft”. 
52 Hans Küng: Islam – eine umstrittene Religion.  Feindbild – Idealbild – Realbild. Retrieved 
5/27/06 from http://www.eidz.de/downloads/Islam.rtf.  
53 Zeev Maoz (Hrsg.) (1997): “Regional Security in the Middle East.  Past Present and 
Future,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv. 
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effective strategy and will be applied time and again.  It is to be expected that 
future (armed) conflicts will also be ideologized in concrete crises for 
opportunistic reasons.54  
However, these cultural imaginations give free reign to terror, and the 
higher the level of ideologizing, the more victims are allowed.55 
In this connection, Kandel sees no alternative to a "secular democratic 
state and a civilian society in which various religions and cultures peacefully 
compete with one another, recognizing fundamental democratic principles of 
constitution."56 
Individualization as an aspect of value pluralism still has will have even 
more to be considered to a larger extent, in particular with respect to recruitment 
in the armed forces and the concept Innere Führung.  As a matter of fact the 
potential of the concept Innere Führung is partly not only unused, it was even 
turned into its opposite.  At least concerning the depicted cultural trends, the 
concept is supposed to be re-established in its original meaning and purpose.  
Therefore, it will become necessary to create a link between this particular 
German innovation and the level of the European armed forces as a whole.  
Innere Führung proved itself in German unification; it has proven itself by 
its imitation in the enlargement of NATO and its example to other European 
armies. Innere Führung proves itself, fundamentally, in contrast to the various 
forms of organized violence for totalitarian ideological goals as well as chaotic 
forms of organized violence in the 21st century. The defense of the West can not 
rest on mercenaries, armed fighters for a faceless, malevolent global capitalism, 
or on the Special Forces fighter gone wrong and become a kind of uncontrolled, 
undemocratic group of interests.  Innere Führung as the ideal of an army in a 
democracy must continue to play its role in the altered circumstances of the 21st 
century. 
                                                 
54 Cf.  Global Trends 2002, op.  cit., p. 141. 
55 Cf.  Wolfgang Sofsky: Zeiten des Schreckens.  Amok Terror Krieg, Frankfurt am Main 
2002, p.  95. 
56 Kandel, op.  cit. 
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III. TRANSFORMATION 
A. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
Other nations and armies beyond The US Department of Defence57  are 
presently aware of the drastic changes in the global security environment in 
recent years, nor is the US DoD  alone in recognizing that these changes 
represent the driving factor for the need to adapt the armed forces.58 
Consequently, the following chapter will summarize the rationale for the 
transformation process of the German armed forces, how the strategic level of 
the Bundeswehr defines its national level of ambition and how they derived the 
newly defined categories of forces in general. 
Furthermore, this chapter aims to put some emphasis on the milestones 
Germany has reached so far and where it stands in the progress of its projects, 
including an overview of the following conceptual work.  It will finish with some 
aspects of the vision of interagency interaction.  So the main purpose of this 
chapter is to depict the organizational frame for necessary and possible 
modifications for the concept Innere Führung training within the German armed 
forces.  Later on the focus will be on the training in preparation for the work in 
multinational units. 
In recent years, Germany has witnessed a drastic change in the security 
environment.59  The reorientation of NATO60 and the European Union61 toward 
                                                 
57 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century – Hart-Rudman Commission (1999): 
“New World Coming: American Security in the 21 st Century,” Washington D.C. Retrieved 3/24/06 
from http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/reports.htm. 
58 Wolfgang Fechner (2001): “Ohne die USA geht nichts – Ohne die Europäer auch nicht“, 
in: Europäische Sicherheit 3/2001, S.  10 – 13. 
59 Jürgen Schnell (2001): “Allgemeine Entwicklungstendenzen im internationalen System.” 
Retrieved 4/2/06 from www.unibw-muenchen.de/campus/WOW/v1054/publikation/ 
Zukunft%20BW/Entwicklung_2001.pdf. 
60 U.S. Army (2001): “Concepts for the Objective Force“ (White Paper). Retrieved 3/12/06 
from www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/default.htm. 
61 Holger Mey (2001): “Der Krieg war und bleibt ein Verwandlungskünstler – Welchen 
Bedingungen unterliegen die Konflikte der Zukunft?” in: Das Parlament, Nr.  10, 2001. Retrieved 
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global crisis management62, as well as the considerable rise in the number of 
Bundeswehr missions (from Somalia to the Congo), have led to an increasing 
need for a fundamental transformation of German forces.63  New challenges 
include: cultural developments, new forms of conflict (i.e., war against terrorism, 
small wars), new tasks (i.e., nation building, conduct of semi–police law-and-
order functions, such as in the Balkans) and a high degree of joint operation and 
integration (multinationality), increased speed of technical, cultural and structural 
innovation (i.e., cyber war, network-centric warfare, digitalization of 
information).64 
The priorities in the Bundeswehr´s spectrum of tasks have structurally 
been adapted by German makers of strategy—both civilian and uniformed--to the 
most likely future missions.  Conflict prevention and crisis management, as well 
as support of allied partners, will be of top significance. This study will come back 
to this fact in the following chapter, when the necessary consequences for the 
concept Innere Führung will be drawn.  
To address the changing security environment, this chapter recalls the 
“chain of events” that has led to the overarching aim to initiate a transformation 
process in the German armed forces. In the early 1990s, the Bundeswehr began 
to face more and more commitments outside Germany.65  It is easy to imagine 
that these missions immediately constituted new challenges for the German 
armed forces--in terms of the types of mission as well as their geographic 
extension (1990 6,000 MBT, decision of constitutional court 1994).66 
                                                 
62 Jens van Scherpenberg (2001): “Transatlantische Asymmetrien.  Die USA als "benign 
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Culturally and structurally considered, the missions became more 
demanding.67  The contingents to be sent abroad grew in size and the scope and 
the number of multinational-joint operations became more comprehensive.  With 
respect to the most recent challenges, however, the German ministry of defence 
finally realized that they wouldn’t be able to cope with these ever more 
demanding missions in an old-fashioned way.  On search for a new mission for 
the Bundeswehr--derived from the experiences of ongoing missions and to be 
reached within a couple of years--Germany would fall short and be overtaken by 
events.  Instead, a transformation process is required that will not lead to a 
predetermined final status to be reached within a certain timeframe, but will be an 
ongoing process of adaptation.68  The overarching aim of the transformation is to 
improve the operational readiness of the German armed forces in a process step 
by step.  With the “Defence Policy Guidelines” and the “Directives for Further 
Development”69 these fundamental changes in German security policy 
environment have been taken into account.70 
Based upon these, the new concept of the Bundeswehr was signed by the 
Minister of Defence on 9 August 2004.  It constitutes the basic document for the 
future Bundeswehr transformation process, mainly focused on structures and 
technology.  
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This new concept of the Bundeswehr defines the national level of policy, 
describes the important role of network-centric operations and defines the new 
force categories.71  Furthermore the general framework for the future force 
structure and the personnel body as well as the planning for new material and 
equipment is laid out. 
With the new concept of the Bundeswehr the conceptual basis for the 
transformation process is laid down, at least regarding the technology and the 
basic structures.  Obviously, transformation of the Bundeswehr has to be more 
than only new structures or weapon systems.   
It also includes: thinking as a globally engaged force, training–mission 
oriented, concepts–conflict termination and stabilization, economy of resources 
and use of potentials for innovation.  However, so far there is no identifiable 
process at work, which reflects the soft factors of transformation.  In other words: 
the institution “Innere Führung” did not adjust to the particular requirements 
based upon the cultural developments and the ongoing transformation process.  
Consequently, the following part will at first stress the aim of the transformation 
process. 
Basically, it is to improve on an enduring basis the Bundeswehr‘s 
operational readiness across the entire mission spectrum.  Therefore structures, 
organization and training will have to be adapted to that goal.  In addition, 
materiel and equipment planning will concentrate on it, while reflecting the scarce 
resources.  As a consequence of this, anything that does not support the goal of 
improved operational readiness is regarded to be of secondary importance.   
This implies a quick discarding of aging equipment designed to deal with 
the threats of the cold war era in central Europe–a unique challenge especially 
for the Bundeswehr.72 
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The comprehensive realignment of the Bundeswehr to conflict-prevention 
and crisis-management operations abroad, to include the fight against 
international terrorism, necessitates an adapted capability profile for the German 
armed forces. They must be responsive, effective, robust, sustainable and 
capable of conducting combined operations with other nations’ armed forces.   
To achieve this, Germany defined the capability profile as comprising six 
interlinked capability categories: command and control capability, intelligence 
and reconnaissance, mobility, operational effectiveness, support and 
sustainability, and  survivability and force protection. 
The improvement of existing capabilities must take into account both the 
joint approach of the Bundeswehr and its multinational integration.73   
Overall, the six capability categories will be fleshed out in such a way that 
the armed forces are gradually enabled to conduct network-centric operations.  
Interoperability is the key to both jointness and multinationality.74  For this 
adaptation process toward operational readiness, Germany has defined the 
“National Level of Ambition”.75  As explained before, Germany has of course 
pledged to maintain the most important international commitments.  These 
consist of possible contributions of various sizes and capabilities to the NATO 
Response Force.  This requires a pool of some 15,000 troops at any time.  
Additionally, Germany provides its share of the European Headline Goal with 
18,000 soldiers.  This includes the contribution to the new ”European Battle 
Group Concept”.76 
And finally, the commitment to the United Nations Standby Arrangements 
System will be maintained, totalling roughly 1,000 troops.   
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Germany wants to be able to field up to 14,000 soldiers in future 
Stabilization Operations in up to 5 different operational areas.  Thus, it will post a 
considerable contribution to global peacekeeping operations, which in turn 
underlines the German ambition to shoulder growing responsibilities in and for 
the international community.  Furthermore, the Bundeswehr will have some 1,000 
troops available for Rescue and Evacuation Operations under national 
command.77  All German forces will be used for their main task--the protection of 
Germany and its citizens78--whenever necessary.  All forces will take their share 
in supporting the necessary operations in the case of catastrophic accidents or 
other scenarios where German armed forces capabilities are needed.  All of 
these efforts will be made within the constraints of the German constitution.   
In past as well as in current operations, Germany has usually built up self-
sufficient contingents, containing all the capabilities needed for a certain mission. 
They included national support elements, and were usually were 
exchanged entirely after a six-month tour of duty.  The ministry of defence 
believes it is no longer either necessary or feasible to field these exclusively 
nationally supported contingents. 
Instead, Germany will send modular capability packages that have been 
synchronized with allies and other partner nations.79  However, so far these 
packages are not specifically trained for this multinational environment. 
As a result, in the same operation a German force might have modular 
packages with differing endurance periods.  The kinds of modules depend on the 
mission’s requirements and capabilities of partners.  Germany will gain the 
structural flexibility to put certain key-capability packages into operation on 
shorter notice, which strengthens the responsiveness vis-à-vis the global crisis 
scene.  German forces’ spectrum of tasks varies from war fighting to 
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78 Baker. 
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humanitarian support, and includes peacekeeping missions.  Even missions to 
assist with humanitarian support have to be considered. 
This broad spectrum of tasks80 calls for more specialized and 
differentiated forces that are able to meet specific mission needs and are trained 
and equipped accordingly.81  This has finally led to the development of new 
categories of forces that will now be described. 
As shown, the Bundeswehr has to be able to employ troops with 
warfighting capabilities82 for joint- and network-based operations of the highest 
intensity and complexity.  A 35,000-strong Response Force seems to be 
adequate and affordable.83 
Stabilization Operations will be the most likely and majority of operations 
conducted by German troops.  These operations will last over a period of time 
and require continual troop rotation.  Germany aims for a four-month tour as an 
average.  Stabilization forces will prepare the ground for political solutions to 
conflicts, consequence management and nation-building tasks.84  A total of 
70,000 will be considered sufficient to meet the National Level of Ambition.  A 
maximum of 14,000 deployed troops at a time will be able to conduct 
Stabilization Operations.  They need to be trained and equipped on a mission-
tailored basis, which makes a difference in comparison with the reaction forces 
(example: Engineer, Intelligence, Patrol).  They also need to be able to take part 
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in network-centric operations to work together with Response Forces and with 
other multinational forces, if required.85 
The Support Forces will comprise 147,500 soldiers--including 2,500 
reservists.  They are supplemented by the majority of the Bundeswehr´s 75,000 
civilians.  The Support Forces will, for example, ensure logistics and transport, 
run depots, and provide military police forces and command-and-control 
capabilities.   
The main aim is to support ongoing operations of the German Response-
and-Stabilization Forces.  Furthermore, the training facilities, schools, 
academies, and peacetime command structure will be part of the Support 
Forces.  But only regarding the training facilities – not concerning the training 
tasks – the support forces are connected to the multinational environment.. 
In relation to the National Level of Ambition86, this means that, with the 
Response Forces, the Bundeswehr will take on the tasks deriving from its 
commitments to the NATO Response Force87, the European Headline Goal88 
and other international commitments.  Additionally, it will provide the assets for 
Evacuation Operations under national command as part of the national level of 
ambition. 
Stabilization Forces will form up to five contingents, with a maximum total 
of 14,000 troops.  These will take on tasks in the broad spectrum of peace-
keeping and stabilization operations and take their share of the national level of 
ambition. 
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Last, but certainly not least, the third category of support forces will ensure 
timely and comprehensive support of all ongoing operations in the complete 
spectrum of intensity. 
Furthermore, they will also take care of the basic services for the daily 
routine in the Bundeswehr.  In this context it will also become necessary to 
develop the Innere Führung to an institution, which delivers particular services to 
the military--especially taking into consideration that the armed forces have to 
face the dramatically changed preconditions given by the society and the new 
political environment in general.  Basically the military has to become more 
competitive with civilian enterprises and companies. 
B. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
The following pages will explain the capabilities of the Bundeswehr 
requiring equipment that is efficient and commensurate with the mission.  In 
order to comprehend the whole background of necessary and possible 
modifications, it is important to depict the general intentions and requirements for 
the German military.89  Basically it is very important to understand, that the 
process of transformation does go beyond equipment also to human factors and 
questions of professional identity.  
First of all, the modernization of materiel and equipment will be rigorously 
geared toward the capability-oriented joint overall approach.  The respective 
scope of procurement is oriented on the three newly introduced force categories, 
with first priority on the reaction forces, followed by strategic mobility and C2.  
The following paragraph will present selected milestones of high 
significance for the transformation of the Bundeswehr.  On 1 November 2004 the 
Minister of Defence released the new Stationing Concept for the Bundeswehr90.  
Besides the already decided closure of 76 garrisons, a further 105 garrisons will 
be closed.  Thus the Bundeswehr in 2010 will be comprised of 392 garrisons, 
chosen solely by their military relevance and by economic criteria.  The former 
                                                 
89 Harald Kujat (2001): “Zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr“, in: Wehrtechnik II/2001. 
90 German MOD (ed), The Bundeswehr in 2002. 
28 
concept, with many widespread–and often small–garrisons of the cold war era, 
was deemed not to meet future requirements.  Units and command posts will be 
collocated and concentrated wherever feasible–thus enabling force integration 
for missions and the joint use of common training facilities.  The CD&E91 process 
will produce important impulses for the innovation, modernization and flexibility of 
the Bundeswehr.  The different relevant levels for transformation in general and 
CD & E in specific are depicted on the Figure 2. 
CD&E from the German point of view is the “engine“ for innovation and 
transformation of the armed forces.  Transformation must focus on delivering the 
products of Transformation: new capabilities; good ideas won’t serve any 
purpose unless they can be rapidly converted into capabilities.92  The German 
armed forces cannot afford to get stuck in a process of endless staff concepts 
that never yield capabilities for the Joint Operator.  The ability to conduct 
Network-Centric Operations represents one of the main pillars of the 
Bundeswehr Transformation.  With its implementation, Germany will have a new 
dimension of a system of command and control, reconnaissance and effects at 
its disposal.   
The national Concept will cover all aspects of national understanding on 
NCO, analyze the consequences for German Forces and outline the required 
changes in their capability profile, in concepts, procedures, exercises and 
training.  It is currently developed and will be issued later in 2006. Germany has 
developed and evaluated the first concepts of how to realize the technical 
solution–an IT system for the Bundeswehr, so to speak. 
With CD&E Germany will gain experience--a “first grip”--on how to do 
networks.  In the adapted procurement-planning, highest priority has been given 
to those projects that are vital for networked operations.93 Efficiency is an 
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important prerequisite for transformation.94  Therefore, the Bundeswehr will be 
relieved of all tasks that can be performed more economically using modern 
forms of co-operation and financing.95  However, it must be clear that economic 
considerations are strictly limited by operational requirements. 
Thus, Germany identified areas that are suitable for outsourcing to third 
parties.   
The Development, Procurement and Management Group assumed a 
central role in the coordination and co-operation with trade and industry and in 
creating additional leeway for investments.  The vehicle pool and the clothing 
management are examples.   
Secondly, the Bundeswehr’s management procedures are replicated in a 
process-oriented integrated software system utilizing the management 
procedures of business enterprises.   
Finally, Germany is about to establish the army equipment repair and 
maintenance organization, a private-public partnership between the Bundeswehr 
and industrial partners.96 
In the process of transformation the requirement has evolved to adapt 
regulations and procedures concerning political responsibilities and military 
leadership at the highest level.  Therefore, the new “Berlin Decree” was signed 
by the Minister on 21 January 2005.  Being a successor document to the former 
“Blankenese Decree”, it aims at strengthening the joint approach and honors 
changing requirements.   
As a consequence, the position of the Generalinspekteur (CHOD) has 
been strengthened considerably.  In the future, he will be responsible for the 
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overall defence conception, including all aspects of force planning and further 
development, as well as the processes of planning, preparation, execution and 
evaluation of all Bundeswehr operations.  Furthermore, the CHOD takes on the 
overall responsibility for the force’s operational capabilities by defining the 
required abilities and assigning them to the respective services as tasks.  In 
acting as the highest ranking military advisor to the Minister of Defence and the 
government, he is supported by three panels specialized to deal with questions 
concerning procurement, operations and joint military aspects.  The Chiefs of 
Staff of the different services remain in command of their subordinate military 
bodies and are responsible to the CHOD for the operational readiness of their 
services’ forces.   
However, the Chiefs of Staff of the services still report directly to the 
minister and the defence secretaries in their responsibility concerning personnel, 
training, education and related matters. 
As a summary, the “Berlin Decree” consequently contributes to the aim of 
strengthening the operational capabilities and readiness of German forces, as it 
has been initiated with the Defence Policy Guidelines and thus supports the aims 
of the transformation of the Bundeswehr.97  All these challenges associated with 
Transformation also demand some changes in the German MOD.  Therefore, 
last summer, Germany established a high-level Transformation Steering Group, 
with an attached Transformation Working Group.  The main goal is to assure a 
better coordination of all the widespread activities in the frame of Transformation 
and to give advice to the CHOD where appropriate.  When compared to the 
record of the era 1955 until 1990, such reforms under the modern flag of 
transformation signifies an almost revolutionary change in the command and 
leadership of the Bundeswehr. However, it is also a mark of national normalcy in 
the decade and a half of Germany as a unified nation with the heritage of 
democracy and alliance cohesion, that this reform has garnered so little notice.   
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Among other subjects98, so far the group has achieved the following: 
identification of all ongoing projects in a transformation-relevant activities 
catalogue; delimitation of objectives, aims and means of the Bundeswehr 
Transformation from the services’ activities for further development of their 
capabilities, and; definition of objectives for a national simulation and experiment 
test bed. 
Another project is the identification and evaluation of ways to incorporate a 
basic capability to create and use CROP99–and make it available for the NRF 7 
earmarked forces.  In order to support these increased efforts with the necessary 
manpower, the German armed forces have converted the Center for Analysis 
and Studies into a Center for Transformation.   
The conceptual basis for how this center will be utilized in the future has 
been worked out under the Steering Group’s direction and guidance and 
approved by the CHOD.  For the conceptual work the Concept of the 
Bundeswehr, with its capability profile and the force categories, is the basis for 
detailed concepts and sub-concepts.  The capability profile with its overarching 
capability categories is broken down into sub-capabilities and sub-sub-
capabilities in these concepts.   
As a result, Germany has a more or less structured architecture of 
concepts.  Some people might call it a sort of conceptual ”patch-work“ or 
”puzzle“.  A list of concepts and sub-concepts is part of the annex in the concept 
of the Bundeswehr.  They have to be written and issued by the responsible 
branches in the MOD and will be approved by the CHOD, in the case of sub-
concepts approved by the chiefs of the services. 
The concepts describe the identified capability on an abstract level, 
determine how the capability should be filled in within the joint approach and give 
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responsibilities to the services.  The concepts are basis for the further capability 
analysis within the strategic planning process of the Bundeswehr.100 
Writing concepts and harmonizing them is a time-intensive discipline 
within the German MOD but it is, in consequence, also the motor for 
transformation. 
Finally, the following paragraphs will give some remarks on the conceptual 
work concerning the EBA101. The dynamic global environment creates new, 
developing and complex security issues.  Future challenges require a wide 
spectrum of instruments and the military is only one of them.  The collaboration 
of the different departments, GOs and non-government organizations is 
necessary.  From the German point of view a governmental commitment in a 
crisis region must not necessarily involve a military operation, particularly in 
consideration of crisis prevention.  What is important is to use all instruments 
available for the purpose of achieving the desired effect.  The degree of 
collaboration that is realistically possible will vary and range from full integration 
to deconfliction.102 
Germany therefore sees the effects-based approach (EBA) as a concept 
of purposeful, effects-based cooperation between different departments and 
organizations (governmental and non-governmental, civilian and military), to 
include multinational forces, with a view to achieving a common objective. 
There is a requirement for a new way of thinking, eventually leading to an 
overall national security concept that provides the conceptual basis for EBO, so 
to speak.   
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In order to foster the interagency interaction process, Germany started the 
national project STRATEGIC UMBRELLA.  The partner–The German Federal 
Academy for Security Policy--provides a platform for discussions with experts 
from all different organizations and agencies.  What the German armed forces 
are looking for are actionable recommendations on how to achieve the utmost 
mutual benefit in providing the products to the people, friends and partners.  The 
aims are to contribute to the development of a common understanding about 
interagency interaction processes in order to be able to most efficiently apply all 
elements of national power as appropriate when measured against a certain 
scenario.  In addition, it is also an aim to explore actionable recommendations to 
facilitate interagency interaction through a small-sized discovery experiment, 
involving experts from all different organizations likely involved in crisis 
management and conflict termination.   
The results will be integrated in a national concept for interagency 
interaction and then shared with multinational partners. 
C. SUMMARY 
The core of the transformation in the German armed forces of the 21st 
century is made up by the creation of three force categories: Response Forces, 
Stabilization Forces and Support Forces.  These force categories will be properly 
trained and equipped for their respective missions.  The full development of their 
overall capability will stem from joint action.  The Bundeswehr must now be 
consistently oriented to the enhancement of its capabilities.  Most of the 
respective measures will find expression in new structures, adapted materiel and 
equipment planning, and demand-oriented stationing.  Newly shaped along these 
lines, the Bundeswehr will be better prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century and ensure security and protection for Germany’s citizens. Interagency 
interaction seems to be one of the big elephants that have to be eaten bite by 
bite – in addition to the increasing part of multinational obligations even on the 
tactical levels.  As Germany tries to do so, it also needs to agree on some more 
assumptions based upon the trends explained in the first chapter.  This chapter 
suggested an overview of who may be involved in dealing with this specific 
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problem of a radical reorganization, reform and finally transformation in the 
NATO sense of the word of the German military establishment. 
Every organization follows its own agenda and, more than that, every 
single individual has more-or-less personal goals and options, and these 
influence the overall process of action and interaction.  The starting point for 
thinking through the jungle of what the different goals and options may look like 
and how action and interaction may occur must be the analysis of the scenario in 
which action and interaction are required103:  A humanitarian or disaster-relief 
scenario will have different impacts on interagency interaction than will a high-
intensity conflict scenario, even if the set of partners earmarked to deal with it 
stays the same. 
If this all sounds reasonable, Germany can move on to the structure within 
which action and interaction take place.104  Again there are a variety of 
organizations and individuals involved to varying degrees in the overall process.  
These include the international community, national governments and their 
ministries and organizations, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations and, most likely, players not yet addressed. 
All of these organizations can be supportive, neutral or defective, 
depending on their goals and options for responding to the scenario in question.  
There can be economic coalitions, social coalitions and the kind of most 
interest from the military standpoint--military coalitions.  How to act and interact 
within this very complex environment, and how supportive organizations can 
each get the most out of the situation on a mutual basis, is the problem that has 
to be addressed with interagency interaction concepts.  While the tasks and the 
composition of the German Response and Stabilization Forces can be defined 
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relatively clearly and easily, this has to be done a bit more comprehensively for 
the Support Forces.105  As previously mentioned, the 39,000 billets for personnel 
undergoing training and education are accounted for within the Support Forces.  
Besides this, however, a share of the 2,500 reservists of the Bundeswehr 
belongs to the Support Forces as well. 
Therefore, one must consider the category of Support Forces as 
consisting of soldiers on active duty as well as personnel under training and 
reservists.  Of the total of 195,000 professional soldiers, 156,000 will be on active 
duty.  A further share of 39,000 slots is designated for professional soldiers under 
training, which helps to maintain the strength of the units on a very high degree 
of presence.  Additionally, the Bundeswehr includes 55,000 conscripts.  Of these, 
30,000 will serve their basic duty time of 9 months in Germany in order to take 
some of the burden off the shoulders of the deployable force.  Twenty-five 
thousand conscripts will serve an individually selected voluntary duty time of up 
to 23 months in order to be able to take part in operations abroad--mainly 
because their duty time allows them to be trained accordingly.  Consequently, the 
Bundeswehr’s mission needed to be adapted to the new challenges.  The new 
mission is seen as an instrument of comprehensive and proactive security and 
defence policy. 
 
The Bundeswehr’s mission106 is to:  
• Ensure Germany‘s freedom of action in the field of foreign policy 
• Contribute to stability on a European and global scale 
• Ensure national security and defence and help defend allies 
• Promote multinational cooperation and integration 
The defence of Germany against external threats continues to be the 
constitutional and political mission of the Bundeswehr.  Defence as defined by 
the Constitutional Law, however, is not solely limited to defending the borders but 
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must apply wherever risks and threats to Germany‘s and it‘s Allies’ security 
occur. 
The Bundeswehr‘s spectrum of tasks is derived from this mission: 
• International conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight 
against international terrorism 
• Support of Allies 
• Protection of Germany‘s territory and its citizens  
• Rescue and Evacuation operations 
• Partnership and Cooperation 
• Disaster Relief operations including official assistance, natural disasters 
and catastrophic accidents 
The transformation of the Bundeswehr aims at increasing its operational 
capabilities in order to cope with the rapidly changing security and political 
parameters.  Thus, Germany adapted the planning for development and 
acquisition of new equipment to the most probable scenarios. 
In the following, an overview on selected major projects in relation to the 
six categories of the shown capability profile will be presented, projects that 
Germany will realize in the near future.  In order to enhance capabilities in 
command and control, the German armed forces work with a joint-forces C4I 
system.107  
Together with a secure satellite communication system, this will enable 
Germany to lead operations in all possible theatres.  This will, in particular, 
support the principle of network-centric operations.  To ensure its abilities to 
gather detailed intelligence and reconnaissance information, Germany will take 
part in the planned NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance system AGS. 
Furthermore, Germany will develop a UAV108-based solution for signal 
intelligence in the electromagnetic spectrum. Mobility will play a key role in the 
aim to safeguard national security wherever it may be at risk.  Therefore, 
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Germany ordered 60 Airbus A-400 M transport aircraft.  This project is being 
carried out in conjunction with other European countries.   
The German transport capabilities will be complemented with 125 multi-
use transport helicopters (NH-90) to support the in-theatre mobility.  Eighty-three 
of these will be for the army and 42 for the air force.  This multinational European 
helicopter will be able to execute a broad spectrum of roles with its modular 
fittings.  These include transport, EW-support, and Combat Search and Rescue.  
The Navy’s 30 NH-90 will be specialized to fulfill maritime tasks.   High-
endurance vehicles are of the highest importance for support of deployed troops.  
They need the ability to fulfill their tasks using reliable vehicles over a longer 
period of time. 
In order to enhance the forces` Support and Endurance in theatre, 
Germany will speed up the deliveries of 830 DINGO and 100 DURO protected 
vehicles for personnel transport.  Survivability and Protection for German troops 
conducting operations certainly is one of the highest priorities. 
With the development and procurement of special equipment, the future 
needs of infantrymen are considered.109  Survivability will be significantly 
enhanced with a new portable system discriminating between friend and foe. 
This Change will support the fighting elements even in difficult environments 
such as urban terrain.  Various equipment and components for specialized roles 
will support and protect the soldiers in all kind of operations.  These will be 
especially derived from their needs and include special operations.  This will 
include components that enable certain troops to link up every individual into a 
new C4I-system in order to enable network-based operations. 
All this will be complemented by other projects to improve personnel 
protection.  Last but not least, Germany continually strives to improve Mission 
Effectiveness.  To do so, Germany will purchase 180 EUROFIGHTER 2000 
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aircraft.  This is a four-nation, modern fourth-generation fighter.  Other nations in 
this program are Great Britain, Italy and Spain.110 
In the long run, the Eurofighter will be the backbone of the air force.  It will 
be complemented by a reduced number of TORNADO bombers for specialized 
roles. 
The army´s capabilities will be significantly enhanced with 80 new TIGER 
helicopters.111  This European co-production helicopter will take over a number 
of different tasks.  The most important will be anti-tank operations, using various 
modular equipment and armament. 
Germany plans to participate in the multinational project to develop the 
new generation tactical air defence system MEADS.  With this system, German 
capabilities to counter a conventional air threat will be increased significantly.  
But even more important, the Bundeswehr will take a considerable step forward 
in its potential for missile defence. 
Finally, the Navy will achieve important capabilities with the introduction of 
six new submarines of the U-212 class, and the future purchase of four F-125 
frigates. 
Basically, this chapter has suggested how much effort the German armed 
forces have invested into technology and structures. 
However, the first chapter already underlined the changing priorities for 
security policy and the armed forces in general.  To sum up, the lack of 
necessities, based upon the cultural challenges and certain multinational 
requirements, is evident.  Particularly in comparison to the purely structural and 
technologically orientated attempts, the need for an additional cultural approach 
is pretty obvious.  Nevertheless, the first steps have been taken in the right 
direction–but they symbolize only the starting point of a long journey of many 
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different steps.  In order not only to critique this situation, but also to offer a 
suggestion as to how it could be possible to deal with this current situation, the 
following chapter will introduce a certain model.  In terms of improvement of the 
cultural environment (Innere Führung) within the German armed forces, it will 
show a way how transformation can deal will the challenges based upon the 
cultural developments explained in the previous chapter.   Based upon the simple 
diagram depicted in the figure below, the lack of transformation – that means of 
possible improvements - for the organizational culture becomes quite obvious.  It 
depicts the different relevant levels for the transformation process. The micro 
level represents the tactical and the meso the operational level; the macro level 
finally symbolizes the political level.  The different areas of interest (strategy, 























Figure 1.   Levels of Transformation 








IV. A PROPOSED MODEL: INNERE FÜHRUNG, EUROPEAN 
IDENTITY AND TRANSFORMATION 
A.  “INNERE FÜHRUNG” THE CORE IDEALS OF THE BUNDESWEHR 
The term “Innere Führung” describes the concept of citizenship, identity, 
leadership, command, morale, and obedience within the Bundeswehr.  It is 
closely linked to the concept of the "citizen in uniform,” an idea drawn from 
ancient Rome, revived by Machiavelli in the Renaissance and given its modern 
meaning by the French Revolution.  The best description of Innere Führung can 
be found in the central field manual ZDv 10/1 “Innere Führung”112 .  Goals, 
principles and areas of practical use are pointed out in this directive which does 
not exist in English translation.  The main task of Innere Führung is to balance 
the tension between the individual rights of a citizen on the one hand and the 
military duties on the other hand. In other words, to reconcile the central clause 
of the German Basic Law that human dignity is inviolable with the necessities of 
military hierarchy and the demands of the battlefield.  Innere Führung represents 
the idea of an army in a democracy, especially in view of the conflicts of soldier 
and politics in the European past.  Yet it is also an idea and reality that has well 
adapted to the needs of the past fifteen years.  
In addition to that, this concept has also the promise of resolving an age-
old hostility of certain German military figures to the march of technological 
progress, via an emphasis on adjustment to the needs of technological, non-
estate based society.   Based upon the disastrous experiences of the Wehrmacht 
in National Socialism during the Second World War, and the particular criteria of 
nuclear warfare in the face of a divided Germany and the Soviet threat, the 
question of the sense and meaning of being a soldier arose–the question about a 
new tension between military and modern society.113  To be sure, the conditions 
of a half century ago have changed, but the imperative to adapt soldierly service 
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to  the here and now has only grown more intense, something which also applied 
to the figures who created the Bundeswehr and anchored it in the Federal 
German state. 
The founders of the Bundeswehr established Innere Führung in order to 
fulfill three requirements: legitimization, integration and identity.  After 1945, the 
use of the military appeared politically sound within the context of territorial 
national defence within Western integration.114  The “fathers” of the Innere 
Führung–General von Baudissin, de Maiziere and von Kielmansegg–created this 
concept specifically within a European political frame, meaning in an international 
sense.  Second, the military has to be both politically integrated and under 
democratic control within a pluralistic society.  This goal requires a specific 
military identity.115  One of the leading institutions of this ideal for fifty years has 
been the school for Innere Führung in Koblenz, established in 1956/7.  It has its 
own capabilities for scholarly research and prepares officers for new challenges, 
such as women in the military or the effects of overseas deployments on matters 
of leadership and morale in the widest sense.116 
Innere Führung, that is, the institution of leadership, command, morale 
and obedience of an army in a German democracy has been the hall mark of the 
Bundeswehr for more than a half century.  The experience of the last decade and 
more, especially the advent of the Bundeswehr as an expeditionary force for 
security building and low intensity conflict within an even more integrated, 
European and Euro-Atlantic context, has raised new challenges for the core 
cultural ideals of German soldiers.  As in the US, the institutional reform of the 
German armed forces now proceeds under the title of Transformation.117 How is 
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this idea reconciled with the process of the present day character of the German 
soldier as a defender of the Euro-Atlantic area, no longer on the North German 
plain but on the Hindu Kush and, in the spring of 2006, in the land of the African 
great lakes?  Further, as German soldiers serve with regularity in multi-national 
units of its allies, an old problem re-emerges of considerable importance for the 
culture of transformation in NATO and European armies more generally, that is, 
how do Germans avoid the revival of destructive practices that undermine an 
army in a democracy, make a mockery of Innere Führung in its best sense, and 
damage the strategic effectiveness of Germany’s contribution to collective 
defense in the Global War on Terror.118  The phrases Abu Ghraib and Haditha 
suffice to indicate the potential risks that obtain when the soldierly self image, 
linked with the idea of culture is sacrificed in the name of ideology and a wrong-
headed efficiency.  
Nevertheless, the concept of Innere Führung was, right from the 
beginning, doubted by many conservative officers and those in society raised in 
the old school of soldierly virtues119.  The main criticism focused on the lack of a 
clear definition and the missing link to reality especially as such unfolds on 
battlefields that might have resembled those of Russia circa 1943 or some other 
pitiless and relentless site of death, chaos and confusion. 
In the years since the 1980s, emphasis on Innere Führung lost some of its 
focus, not the least because the fear among some hearts and minds that the 
Bundeswehr would endanger democracy proved to be quite empty. At least the 
first tasks have been forgotten, and as a consequence of this fact the concept 
became one of a technique for motivation.  Many are convinced that there is 
neither a harmony between a civilian and military life nor between a military and 
civilian profession.  Even nowadays certain figures in the Bundeswehr complain 
that the concept is not completely put into practice. 
                                                 
118 Hans Kleinsteuber and Barbara Thomaß (2000): “Kommunikation, Medien, 
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“Globale Trends 2000“, Frankfurt/M. 
119  See Abenheim cited above.  
44 
Since 1990, there are new challenges for the concept of Innere Führung.  
Unfortunately it has been little discussed in the public, partially because the 
Bundeswehr has been so effective in its adaptation for the military realities of the 
early 1980s to that of the year 2006.  Due to their increasing out-of-area 
deployments, which began amid much political controversy in the early-1990s,  
the German armed forces have to manage a new kind of leadership in the face of 
a radically different series of risks and threats.  In the past, leadership was strictly 
decentralized in terms of freedom of movement on the lower tactical levels.  
However, being involved in many deployments of the dimension of peace 
enforcement, counter terror, and security building requires a more centralized 
political control because of the fusion of the tactical and strategic levels in these 
kinds of missions.  Even the leader of a small unit can cause political trouble if he 
does not execute the political strategy in his area of responsibility.  This 
procedure is heavily criticized because it ignores the knowledge, education and 
skills of the soldiers on the ground.  Auftragstaktik is seen as a core ideal within 
the greater core idea of Innere Fuehrung, and the manner in which the political 
imperative for the least application of force in such present-day missions amid 
political chaos represents a real challenge for Innere Führung.  However, the 
answer cannot be the resort to a micro-managed soldier with the cult of 
Befehlstaktik that gutted the most cherished principles of German soldierly even 
before the creation of the Bundeswehr. 120 
The crucial change is based upon the cultural development and the 
specific environment in multinational units.121  The culture varies in certain 
scenarios and armies, very often completely.  On the one hand allies such as 
France, Great Britain and the USA still refuse to adjust to this particular German 
concept of maintaining a military culture.122  On the other hand, the German 
armed forces are not willing to sacrifice the most important elements of the 
concept of Innere Führung. 
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It seems urgent that, to meet the needs of an increasing number of 
international missions, Innere Führung be reinvigorated.123 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT FOR SOLDIER’S 
SERVICE AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 
The following discussion is an attempt to find answers to the question of 
how to make “Cultural Development” and "Transformation" educational issues of 
the organizational culture of German armed forces (the concept of Innere 
Führung) and implement it in practice. 
The discussion will focus on the presentation of a model aimed at turning 
the necessary consequences for the transformation to practical use--making 
them operational--in the cultural field.  At the same time, this chapter will also try 
to establish a link between education and the concept of leadership and civic 
education from a cultural perspective, to include the process of transformation, 
and present a model that will illustrate the development of a European military 
identity and intercultural competence.  This concept departs from a broad, 
scholarly reliable basis and relates initially to security structures such as NATO 
and the EU and multilateralism, which follow a political rationale: they symbolize 
the will and the capability of the allies and partners for concerted military action--
interoperability thus becoming a decisive factor of the transformation process.  
Multilateralism, indeed, signifies more than just the establishment of technical, 
tactical and operational interoperability.124  Above all, it is about the integration of 
different national military cultures and traditions that are based on different 
national concepts of order.  Therefore, the standpoint this assumption is going to 
maintain in the course of the following discussion will break with elementary 
assumptions taken for granted.  Here, the thesis suggests that tentative formal 
orientation of interoperability extends beyond the sphere of tactical operational 
concepts and requires the setting of common standards.  The overall objectives, 
however, continue to be military efficiency and optimization of social benignity 
(holistic transformation and/or future-oriented further development). 
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There is, however, the question of whether deepened military integration 
will entail concessions in the field of leadership and civil education. The allied 
armies of Germany do not embrace such enlightened ideals, in all cases, and 
there exists a wide variety of interpretations of the principles of citizenship, 
leadership, and command in the context of the cultural development simulated 
here, identity and professionalism need to be functionally differentiated (civic 
responsibility versus mercenaries). To be honest, the institutions of leadership125 
and civic education seems to be the proper context by which to approach this 
challenge in the spirit of the envisaged reform projects, and to deal with the 
ensuing future-oriented questions in a productive manner. 
But first, the relationship of identity and organization has to be introduced.  
The objective is to find rational solutions to the current range of questions 
by means of a simple model.  The reference parameters for the following 
considerations are the European members of NATO, especially those in favor of 
a unified Europe.126  European military identity, then, is an effective factor in 
bringing about the common will to secure a European confederation127 externally 
and internally.  In the context of transformation, and according to Baudissin's 
logic, it would be the cultural answer to the changed security environment 
(changed face of war, technology, inward orientation), parallel to technological, 
conceptual and structure-related answers.   
Culturally significant is that many European NATO allies have maintained 
an extensive security communications network for 50 years128, the interaction 
processes of which are determined by the existing and future European tasks.129 
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Significant in terms of learning is not only military operational readiness, 
but also the ideal and objective of "leadership and civic education"—“the citizen 
in uniform”--the development of an awareness directed at Europe as a whole.130  
In the following pages a possible model tailored to the national armed 
forces organization will be discussed.  A purposeful utilization of models always 
requires detailed knowledge about the respective players.  Consequently, it must 
be stated as a fact that the qualities, capabilities and characteristic features of 
the players have not yet been sufficiently specified.131  Since 1990, the 
organizational members of the armed forces have been in a situation where--"in 
the middle of the game", so to speak--the cultural circumstances of the 
organization (meaning the previously mentioned general conditions) are 
changing, nobody knows how far, or even if, the reorganization will go on nor to 
what extent and in what way the developments brought about so far will continue 
to retain their validity for an operational force.  Yet the record thus far gives one 
some cause for hope that the German soldier has been, and shall be able to 
master these tasks in manner of Kant’s categorical imperative.  
The "Cold War" was the centre of gravity that, until the year 1990, forged 
the armed forces together.  The German armed forces had been conceived as an 
improved version of the Wehrmacht (in the operational sense) and fitted within 
German democracy integrated within the whole of the Atlantic alliance.  
This was the "guiding concept" where the feasibility projections of the 
(inter)national military met; it determined the way in which players were looked at 
and fed capability analyses.  The transformation of a complex organization of 
armed forces, however, requires considerably more coordinated 
interorganizational effort (for example, between the different institutional 
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agencies and levels).132  Such tasks also unfolded with great success in the cold 
war period, as by the 1970s, the Bundeswehr grew into the second leading force. 
Particularities of the military mission and the size and diversity of the 
military organization, moreover, made the identification of an eventually modified 
(i.e., transformed) and "cultural" military capacity for performance and innovation 
aimed at reducing complexity appear clearly more difficult. 
This means, for instance, that orientation will move away from a 
hierarchical order toward cooperation and project structures.  So far, cultural 
transformation continues to be more or less ignored133--even if transformation is 
conceived as transformation of all members of the organization and of the overall 
organization as such.  To some, however, this limitation is hardly comprehensible 
when looking at the existing armed forces and the goals of the transformation 
explained in the previous chapter.  Thus, it will not be possible to provide a 
satisfactory description and solution of the orientation toward the future by 
staying within the limits of the tensions between the structural levels and their 
interconnections; rather, the meso- and macro-social levels in such organizations 
are of paramount importance.   
The multi-level model in Figure 1 represents coordinated 
interorganizational relationships and further specifies properties of actors or 
mainly organizational-culture "capabilities" (conceptual responsibility rests with 
the Zentrum fuer Innere Fuehrung in Koblenz/Leadership Development and Civic 
Education Centre), is used as another point of reference, and will be shown 
again for illustration purposes.134 
As far as the organizational culture–the concept Innere Führung--of the 
Bundeswehr as an organization is concerned, a specific complex of problems 
has emerged in the grammar, which means within the process of transformation 
structuring.  The basic cultural consensus striven for by way of the leadership 
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and civic education concept wants to accomplish something almost impossible, 
which is a general acceptance of the purposes of the organization despite its 
diversity of interests at all command echelons (a balancing act between the 
military, political, and social fields). While certain processes of change are always 
taking place and clearly have a functional character in terms of the respective 
interest structures, the idea of an armed forces organizational culture is to put to 
work these processes as organizational knowledge and as a coordinated option 
on future challenges, and to interconnect them appropriately. 
What this boils down to is that the Bundeswehr will also, of necessity, 
have to tackle the cultural tasks involved in reaching the transformation 
development135 level.  The background was and continues to be primarily the 
changed framework conditions: there have been changes in the face of war136, 
international cooperation, developments in cultures and societies, new types of 
operations (including the process of getting accustomed to them), and eventually 
the discussion of conscription versus "Cosmopolitan in Uniform". 
Another - permanent - challenge resulting from Innere Führung is the 
development of a professional identity137 in the armed forces and its members in 
an ever changing society and world order. The guiding question for the following 
discussion therefore aims at the HOW, the operational implementation.  What are 
the conceptual inferences that avoid a functionalist, market-oriented adaptation 
of leadership and civic education, a by-product, so to speak, of transformation?  
The attempt so far to capture cultural capabilities can be seen in Figure 1.  
In the future, the requirements regarding the soldiers' personality structure will be 
higher.138 In the Figure 2 the German armed forces are depicted based upon the 
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multilevel model depicted at the end of the previous chapter.  The lack of 
activities in the area of culture becomes again pretty evident, especially on the 
higher levels.139  That means, conceptual work has to be done and new training 
programs have to be established in order to face the new requirements and tasks 
of the transformation. 
















- Case Study “German armed forces” -
 
Figure 2.   Case Study “German Armed Forces” 
 
Talking about a complex and multifunctional profile of soldierly 
competence while, at the same time, being able to respond to different role 
requirements is only the start. The question now is how to balance these different 
poles in an individual qualification and identification profile? 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFORMATION 
A European military identity140 is already being imparted across a 
transnational and military NATO infrastructure, which carries educational content  
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into each military unit.141  This occurs on the basis of wilfully renouncing national 
sovereign rights in order to deepen military and political integration.142  The aim 
is to arrive at a personal mindset regarding the idea of Europe being worth 
defending (e.g., using the concepts of liberty and justice from European 
intellectual history, which must be continued).  According to Royl (1998) these 
cultural pedagogical elements will then form the basis for the development of a 
European military identity.  The point of departure is the raison d'être143 of the 
armed forces, according to Baudissin: the armed forces will provide services to 
protect the European culture, to secure it and to shape peace in a society willing 
and ready to intervene.  The soldiers must be able to draw on the contents of the 
European culture to develop the necessary frame of mind.  Soldiers from one 
country must develop a mindset regarding the positive contributions made by the 
countries of other soldiers--from a current point of view--toward the development 
of Europe, in order to provide a basis for restructuring the requirements 
motivating the use of military force.144 Taking these fundamental idealistic motifs 
and the implications of current cultural trends for national security (Chapter II) as 
a starting point, the development of a European military identity is an educational 
event that could also include reservists, particularly as leadership and civic 
education were designed as a steady, individual and social formation process.  
Therefore, this explanation will continue by going into more detail regarding the 
cultural development and its impact on the military field, in order to elucidate the 
connection between transformation, culture-related organizational development 
and the leadership and civic education concept.  In the year 2005, the members  
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of the Bundeswehr find themselves in a situation145 where it is unclear to what 
degree the cultural codes they have until now learned and experienced during 
phases of tactical and operational dominance, and the way in which this 
happened, will retain their validity for the future146 and even current operational 
spectrum.  Such an uncertainty not only demands but provides the opportunity 
for a conceptual reorientation (=transformation), which was therefore already 
depicted in the previous chapter. 
For the German armed forces, this means–even forced by the cultural 
development--a dynamization boost to be resolved not only through functional 
and technical, but also through further adaptation patterns.  The more these 
factors have in common, the more Germany has occasion to assume that the 
interactive processes taking place during operations will generate results 
compatible with transformation.  Every process of change--hence, the 
transformation, too--is based on this information processing and identification 
process and, to prevent Innere Führung from dwindling to a mere leadership 
philosophy in the tactical sense, its services may also be enlisted to support the 
concept for identity formation.  The recommended revision  of Innere Führung 
would then contradict the alleged lack of purpose and disorientation since 1990 
or 2001 (organized crime, terrorism, civil war).  What is the aim of further cultural 
development, meaning, what are the specific development tasks to be handled in 
connection with transformation or to be derived for the purpose of such complex 
interplay of effects? 
The structural changes of the asymmetric military-terrorist threat in 
connection with the events of 11 September 2001 also changed the cultural 
requirements147 for a European defence system, to be inferred from the 
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emancipative potential that has so far been considerably underestimated.148  In 
the context of the cultural development of the armed forces organizations, and in 
order to be successful in operation, the requirements for each serviceman (as 
well as the entire organization) to make substantial adaptation efforts quickly 
becomes evident due to the sudden integration and cooperation in multinational 
contingents. If the leadership and civic education concept--in the context of 
cultural change and the original purpose of the concept Innere Führung--is to 
master this change, situations must be diagnosed, possible future developments 
anticipated, necessary changes recognized, leeway for action gained, and 
approaches to solutions evaluated and implemented.  For its purposeful 
implementation in the Bundeswehr, the pedagogical interest in a European 
military identity will have to be fleshed out by way of the rekindled popularity and 
applicability of the concept of education (identity + competence). It will be 
necessary to identify learning objectives and determine which behaviour will be 
adequate in connection with certain subject contents in order to do justice to the 
delicate situation of the special pedagogical role claimed by the Bundeswehr.  
The following treats the development of a European military identity. 
1. European Military Identity149 
Basically, cultural development takes place by means of symbols, 
according to interests and habits, yet primarily in a cultural and social context.  
Culture is reprocessed by fellow members of society according to the stereotypes 
they encounter. Therefore, culture is an outsider's view of what the insider 
produces. This is contrary to popular opinion that argues that culture is a group 
who demonstrate similar qualities.  Different definitions of culture reflect different 
theories for understanding - or criteria for evaluating - human activity.  Instead of 
highlighting the differences, the present model therefore focuses on common 
European features.  In this context, it must be noted that the concept of 
education used to be highly controversial, and has always been quite 
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questionable, because it includes problematic connotations.150  Still, this train of 
thought has to be discussed in more detail by looking more closely into 
dispositional and detailed learning objectives (following Strittmatter). 
Together, members of the organization develop common assumptions 
regarding the aspired reality of the organization and its goals.  They come to an 
agreement concerning these reality assumptions or negotiate them with one 
another.  This understanding shakes the assumption, taken for granted, that all 
members of an organization always have a clear understanding of the common 
reality (rationality of political education) in its foundations.  During the "Cold War", 
for instance, certain forms of interaction and communication (but still the East 
German army and Russia were not “enemies”) in the Bundeswehr rigidified, so 
that they could no longer be experienced in context and were no longer 
challenged due to their habitual, routine use.  From this perspective, cultural 
learning would thus be linked with a reactive learning concept. 
This form of education challenges the institutional context of action, while 
standards and objectives need to be redefined. This redefining process is based 
on opening up, assessing and propagating new knowledge while exercising 
constructive criticism and abandoning obsolete knowledge.  This, of course, 
includes saying goodbye to ingrained action patterns and assumptions.151  
Cultural interoperability is thus the target projection for the cultural 
development within the context of the transformation of the Bundeswehr, which 
will prevent right away any suspicion of operational forces--also from different 
countries--being favored or disfavored over others.  Intercultural appreciation is 
attributed to equality in operations152 and when expected to make sacrifices.  
Preparing a military organization for contingencies of this type during times of 
                                                 
150 Jürgen Kuhlmann and David R. Segal (1994): “Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third 
Millennium”, in: Forum International, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München. 
151  This idea is also present in Carl von Clausewitz: “Vom Kriege“, Hinterlassenes Werk des 
Generals Carl von Clausewitz.  Vollständige Ausgabe im Urtext, drei Teile in einem Band, 19.  
Auflage, Bonn 1980 und 1991 (1.  Auflage 1832-1834). 
152 Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel (2002): “Neue Kriege? Neue Kämpfer?”, Arbeitspapier 2/2002 der 
Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung, Universität Hamburg. 
55 
peace requires both weapons handling (functionality through skill) and, above all, 
mental training.  This leads to the definition of dispositional learning objectives.   
56 
Dispositional learning objectives are differentiated from operation-specific 
objectives in that they set the internal conditions for a number of different 
behaviors instead of tying behavioral elements to teaching contents.153  Such 
dispositional objectives have their didactic worth in making personnel who will be 
part of a European military identity sensitive to the fact that positive behavior on 
the outside must be rooted in a corresponding mental attitude.   
• Having developed an awareness for the necessity of internal and 
external security for Europe 
• wanting to make a contribution to European security 
• deeming the people of past or present opponents worth of the same 
degree of protection as one’s own people 
• considering security problems in a pan-European perspective   
• developing an awareness for something 
• identifying with something 
• setting one's mind on something 
• accepting something as a positive value 
• combining individual and organizational objectives for the purpose of 
transformation   
An example of a specific objective is: How could the planned process be 
recognizably reflected in the individual person's behavior? The standard didactic 
procedure to use is the operationalization of learning objectives.  The following 
examples are used to illustrate this point: 
Security Policy Awareness: being able to name present crisis areas; being 
able to describe the changes in military threats; assessing Europe's position.   
Cultural Identification:  being able to describe France's accomplishments 
in the development of universal human rights; being able to explain the  
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connection between the USA and European development of human rights 
(Statue of Liberty); being able to judge the mental barriers separating Turkey and 
Greece. 
Development of Knowledge: staying informed on security policy; visiting 
military units; participating in military exercises; dealing with the arguments 
brought forth by peace initiatives in an objective way. 
Acceptance of Values: being able to establish the connection between the 
oath of office or enlistment and routine duty; being able to show recognition of 
and commitment to the common good in one's conduct of life; supporting the 
upkeep of war graves. 
In the Figure 3 the correlation of those elements is depicted as an 
interaction between (intercultural) awareness, (personal) will, (individual) thinking 
and (individual) identification. 
For instance, these elements could be focused by the new established 
training for change management at the German staff and command college in 
Hamburg. 
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European Military Identity






Figure 3.   European Military Identity (1) - Curricular Concept 
 
The idea is to expand the concept of defence readiness that is rooted in 
national identity to include a sense of European security needs. It is through 
communication that the notion of transformation is eventually strengthened and  
59 
developed and its organizational effectiveness increased.155 All efforts an army is 
engaged in are eventually legitimized by the overarching purpose pursued by the 
organization, which they serve. 
Defence in a purely nationally oriented form is evidently no longer enough 
of a purpose in view of the known threats.156 Therefore, the pedagogical interest 
is first and foremost directed at the formation of the individual self.  Now, the 
question arises as to the model that might be the underlying concept for such a 
development task, and what kind of support could be helpful to promote this 
development in the context of transformation. 
From a learning theory perspective, the questions must be answered how 
the desire for defence and military defence competence, firmly rooted in a 
sustainable organizational culture, can be taught. 
- Dispositional objectives












Figure 4.   European Military Identity (2) - Curricular Concept 
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Hence, the Bundeswehr is the place where the spirit of European military 
identity can formed and be communicated, at first as a role identity with the 
possibility of integrating essential elements of this identity as segments into the 
formation of the self.  Numerous autobiographies are proof of this process.  The 
serviceman of the Bundeswehr organization who sharpens his awareness of 
identity in this way will stand up for tolerance toward dissenters and consequently 
maintain the openness of the political system typical of a democracy.157  This 
task should be integrated into the curriculum dealing with the practical application 
of the concept of Innere Führung (leadership and civic education) during military 
training, but should also be found in other learning locations outside of the 
sphere of the Bundeswehr and in the context of state institutions.  One aspect of 
European military identity is the establishment of the Franco-German Brigade, for 
instance, which is aimed at improving alliance qualities (and the differentiation 
from NGOs in the theatre of operations).  Owing to its manageable size and 
political weight, this bi-national brigade provides an area for perfecting of the 
European military identity in the context of a sustainable organizational culture, to 
practice the considerable stress generated by multi-nationalism, and to give the 
highly fragile and unstable identity of the armed forces a profiling mark. 158 The 
established multinational airborne elements last, but not least, provide the 
chance to apply the program for the development of a European military identity, 
not just under the conditions of two interacting partners as is the case with the 
Franco-German Brigade, but entering into relationships with more different 
nations (care must, however, be taken to prevent the formation of exclusive 
rights or extreme elites within the military ethics as could occasionally be 
observed to happen within the leadership of the Special Forces Command).  The 
Europeans, moreover, should take advantage of their common operation in the 
Balkans to seek ways for intensifying effective cooperation.  Not only is training 
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together the best basis for tackling common tasks, but it would be beneficial to 
everyone and signal awareness of security interests.159 
Variations of this basic pattern always tend to show up when, for instance, 
the commander in theatre is of different nationality.  The commitment to Europe 
derives thus from the personnel's roots in the European culture and the 
dependence of the European culture on those ties.  Eventually, this commitment 
will serve the Bundeswehr by making the development of military identity part of 
the transformation in an everyday military culture.160 
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Making European security interests (in this case caused by the cultural 
developments), and the European defence readiness161, part of the personality 
means therefore developing a European military identity.  The establishment of 
cultural interoperability is aimed at creating innovative prerequisites which will 
enable military personnel to cope with future conflicts.162  Hence, creating 
cultural interoperability means reaching a common understanding of the quality 
military defence readiness is to have in the future.  Being a member of the 
European armed forces will then mean the cultural integration of the readiness to 
loyally serve and bravely defend Europe and make it relevant to any action.  This 
approach intentionally avoids the image of Europe as a supranational edifice, 
because this would easily blur the phased nature of the inductive structure of 























Figure 5.   European Military Identity (3) - Curricular Concept 
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Based upon the prospects of a European military identity depicted in the 
figure above, the following description turns to the target projection established in 
connection with the development of--so to speak--cultural capabilities.  
The awareness of Europe's common ground163 will have to be planned in 
a didactically stringent manner and supported by using effective methods of 
logical communication processes.  Cultural development is aimed at creating 
new cultural (problem-solving) capabilities (also to support and accompany 
structural optimization measures in a social context) by detecting, correcting and, 
above all, establishing or altering organizational operational relationships 
("group-specific identity potential").  Taking the current speed at which 
multinationalization of major units (MND, European Corps, ARRC164, etc.) is 
taking place, the act of transforming in a purely reactive, semantic (i.e.,  
rhetorical) manner does not suffice. 
Particularly as, until now, no tangible concept of leadership and civic 
education can be recognized as cultural response to the requirements of on-
going operations165, and, so far, the connection between state, armed forces and 
society has not undergone further substantial development (this lack can also be 
noticed in politics/society, not only at the Leadership Development and Civic 
Education Centre.  The concept of leadership guidance, however, seems to be 
the only innovation coming from Koblenz {Zentrum Innere Fuehrung} so far, 
which has unfortunately no relevance to culture-related development.)  As has 
already been discussed, it is of considerable importance that the discussion of 
leadership and civic education and transformation that, so far, has been lacking 
any distinctive quality, will time and again preventively clarify and demonstrate 
what is being transformed--when, with what practical consequences, for whom, 
by whom, with what effort in terms of time and technology, and with what further 
consequences. 
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2. Cultural Awareness 
The following part of this chapter will deal with the details of the concept 
on the development of intercultural competence. Owing to the nature of a 
dynamic and innovative society166, the future demands a complex self-image and 
capability profile of soldiers.  Therefore, a few ideas will be presented on why 
"intercultural competence" during education and training, at least for officer 
candidates/officers167, is absolutely imperative.  The fact that the "Bundeswehr" 
as an organizational system is overly complicated is currently also reflected in 
the way the complexity of the system is perceived and in the fact that too much is 
expected of the servicemen, for instance, on operations or even during pre-
deployment training.168  This excessive inherent complexity appears in the forms 
of diversity (the amount of data is too much to handle), in the form of multiplicity 
(alternative courses of action bear numerous uncertainties), and in the form of 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious oppositions (the individual must deal with 
conflicting requirements).169 
What is lacking so far is a well arranged, practice-oriented, exemplary and 
methodical answer.170  If this chapter treats the European military identity and 
intercultural competence for the military commander as a consequence of 
learning processes rooted in an organizational culture in the Bundeswehr, this 
will be done against the background of international crisis management as a part 
of the task spectrum, with intercultural encounters inevitably happening in this 
environment.  Possible training concepts are depicted in the figure below.  In 
addition, anticipatory crisis awareness may be recognized as an element of 
cultural development, and corresponding interfunctional qualifying programmes 
are demanded that aim at shared strategic responsibility.  The close links 
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between the armed forces, the economic sector and economic thinking now also 
influence the command and organization processes, and sometimes even lead to 
a dangerous estrangement, even separation, of leadership and civic education.  
Multilateralism in this case rests between the conflicting areas of military 
efficiency and the integration of political objectives (e.g., national rules of 
engagement, staff work, military action by the different contingents).171 Which 
positive experience from trade and industry can be transferred to the armed 
forces?   This idea, further, was originally in Graf Baudissin’s idea in the 1950s, 
and followed the lead of Ludendorff in 1917 in his re-invention of the tactical level 
for defensive war, that is, a functionalist levelling of hierarchy and an equality of 
task organization. Take, for instance, experience gained from overcoming 
communication barriers between down-to-earth, everyday, and expert cultural 
views of problems. 
The aim is to impart a cognitive orientation
structure!




















Figure 6.   Cultural Awareness 
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The following culture-dependent orientations may be mentioned as 
primary elements of such a cognitive pattern and, thus, important features of 
intercultural competence: 
• initiative to take up contact 
• willingness to communicate 
• purposeful interaction 
• appreciative interaction 
• emotional stability   
For the purpose of an elementary framework condition, the entire 
exchange of information and communication--by way of an analysis of the new 
security environment172--is to focus initially on the learning measures aimed at  
the attainment of intercultural skills, and the resulting structural consequences 
and special issues, within a foreseeable period of time for all participants in an 
operation abroad.173  All the above, however, do not exist as isolated subjects, 
but will mutually interact and support each other, especially since education is a 
key issue for the armed forces and the development of leadership and civic 
education. Intercultural competence has a guiding, as well as motivating and 
coordinating, effect.  Especially in situations which are largely unsettled and 
uncertain, causing traditional orientation, motivation and coordination patterns to 
dissolve and lose their social binding force, it may help to manage such 
situations. Possible training concepts are, for instance: Information-, culture-, 
interaction-, and comprehension-oriented training.  In all cases the aim is to 
impart a cognitive orientation structure. The method pursued in Innere Führung 
should therefore not only be applied to analyses, but also to the conclusions to 
be drawn from within the transformation process!  Which framework parameters 
must be considered? The world is obviously becoming increasingly complicated. 
At the social level it is the tendency toward individualism, but also the 
conditions of ever-rising standards, such as "new wars" and internationalization.  
In addition, there are surges of knowledge, with increasing amounts of 
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information becoming obsolete within ever-shorter periods of time.  
Consequently, confidence-building structures are needed.  Under the confusing 
conditions outlined, cultural learning builds up confidence that has gotten lost in 
time and space.  Transformation is therefore becoming increasingly necessary as 
a rationalization strategy within the rapid changes in the global security 
environment174, because the organization in its false primacy of the market as 
the sole arbiter of all norms cannot handle uncertainty.  Cultural learning is one 
way now to put an end to this feeling of powerlessness.  Cultural development, 
moreover, offers new leeway for consensus and harmonization.  And thus, 
conceptually, many hopes are raised by, and much is projected into, this 
rationalization type.  In the future, the armed forces organization will distinguish 
itself by its interlinking and networking, and the use of all its potentials.175  
Transformation appears, then, in an optimistic sense to be a metaphor for 
change based on distinguishing between knowledge and ignorance.  To one way 
of thinking, this is all about filling the system with knowledge, meaning basing 
networked organizations on knowledge--and with the equipment mode being set 
to transformation for the time being.  The "citizens in uniform" are--so far--the 
ones who keep knowledge available for the system, thus making it accessible.  
Accessibility of the knowledge will be ensured and purposefully organized 
through networking.  The organization “transforms“, in as much as the 
accessibility of knowledge is well organized by way of a holistic access to the 
subjects.  Not only must knowledge about transformation be acquired and taught, 
but this knowledge must also be made available to the organization, and the 
consequences of this knowledge must be made accessible.  Moreover, this 
knowledge must be organized and distributed via networking processes ("homo 
connectus").  The aim is to reach a higher efficiency through better use of the 
human resources available and the social conditions.  From the perspective of 
theory, only a learning concept reduced with respect to system theory and 
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constructivism seems to be conceivable for the implementation of transformation 
in the cultural sphere of the overall organization.176  For that purpose, learning 
necessitates a differential impulse, i.e., a perception of a difference of the 
awareness system or the social communication system: the observation of 
difference (integration of differential impulses into existing structures and the 
possibilities of future processes that permit updating).  The effect of the cultural 
development is the subjective and communication-based competence--and that 
is the desired product of the systemic rationalization intentions of transformation, 
and will be the result of coupling subject-related processes with communication-
related processes.  As a concept, it is especially designed to rationalize this 
context.  Without soldiers who keep learning--more precisely, who are receptive 
to learning and also willing to learn--there will be no transformed and 
transforming organization.177  Learning defies delegation, which is indicative of 
the fact that transformation will always be fraught with uncertainty.178  And it is 
exactly this uncertainty that appears to be the driving and productive factor.  
Transformation and understanding its necessity are therefore the 
consequences of modernization through transformation, but they are also in the 
service of a systemic modernization and reflexive rationalization of the armed 
forces themselves who, in return, produce results and follow-up capabilities, 
render possible the finding of meaning, and organize complexity.  On the other 
hand, the organization also needs reductions in complexity.  Thus, the 
operationalization of the modernization problems proceeds in accordance with 
the principles of leadership and civic education.  Owing to this conversion into a 
business-like structure (that is, the connection with economic realities and their 
purposeful control) the form of specialist military training will also change.  This 
type mostly requires adjustments regarding future-oriented leadership and 
management and the design of strategic changes. 
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It is no longer merely a functional, selective compensating and designing 
agency, but is intended to give more and more modernization impetuses, 
affecting the overall organization.  Cultural development will be the normal 
situation for each individual and a standard requirement for all members of the 
organization.  It thus represents a mode that is assigned almost universal 
performance of processing accelerated modernization dynamics in the 
organization.  Transformation is therefore the permanent expectation of the 
organization’s leadership regarding the adjustment requirements in view of 
cursory changes during the modernization process.179  Consequently, the term 
transformation also serves to designate consistent and permanent optimization of 
the capabilities of the Bundeswehr organization in a holistic-systemic 
perspective.180  Innere Führung education is thus to an increasing extent 
approached with the expectation of a far-reaching catalogue of tasks wholly 
drawn from the unchanging requirement of soldiers to adjust to the altered 
political and social conditions of their service, not the least of which is the 
imperative for a single European armed force and a transformed ideal of the 
soldier.    
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Figure 7.   General Conditions 
 
In a consistent manner, transformation organizes the forms of operation 
toward a self-organization capability through high-value networking.181  These 
means and forms will in future allow for flexible and short-notice coordination.  To 
sum up, the figure above shows the interaction of military identity, intercultural 
awareness and cultural development – managed by transformation. 
The organization management182 must now, to an increasing degree, also 
find ways to deal with new confusions that it has helped generate, as has been 
proven several times.  The figure above depicts the correlation – as cause and 
effect at the same time. 
This idea not only implies the theory of education and training as 
established by Scharnhorst183, but also sensitizes individuals for the importance 
of knowledge, its storage, classification, structuring and immediate availability to 
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each and everyone as an imperative prerequisite for the capabilities of an 
organization.  Today, in this context, the establishment of a culture of 
learning/knowledge is discussed, a "system of systems", or "knowledge 
management".  It is to be followed by a necessary expansion of the performance 
of cultural and pedagogical processes for the modernization of the organization 
(ongoing operations) in everyday communication (MND, Euro Corps, ARRC, etc.) 
One could only truly speak of a transformed Bundeswehr organization if 
cultural developments were to introduce a certain reflectivity into the system and 
if that capacity for self-reflection were to become part of a strategy of changing 
one’s own identity184.  Such a capacity for self-reflection would then be a 
characteristic feature of a systemic, rationalized and transformed Bundeswehr 
organization.  Indications of modernization would then be reflected in the 
educationally rather attractive terms of European military identity and intercultural 
competence.  In this context it must, however, be emphasized that getting this 
aspect organized is not "for free".  It is rather a question of cultural development 
being tied to a number of progressive pre-conditions.  The benefit of the 
suggested concept reveals itself especially here, in the fact that "soft" 
parameters, too, are of equal analytical importance.  It also builds on essential 
communication prerequisites such as, for instance, readiness for coordination, 
motivation to perform, capability for innovation and, last but not least, mutual trust 
between leaders and followers at all command echelons.  The issue here is in 
part one of mental pre-conditions that, realistically speaking, will in parts at least 
only be the results of corresponding learning processes.   Once again, cultural 
development--meaning the implementation of transformation in leadership and 
civic education placed on a pedagogic footing--is meant as a preventive 
approach, allowing the Bundeswehr to continue into the future by enabling 
systematic learning and reflection steps regarding the Bundeswehr-relevant 
environmental conditions.185  Within the Bundeswehr, the aspects of security 
                                                 




policy, structure and organizational culture will develop their optimum networking 
quality186 only if everyone involved is adequately informed of the challenges 
"their" organization may possibly face in the future, and included in the 
corresponding planning.  The only "counter-chance" here is to retain the 
hierarchy and establish a uniform team structure (cp. DSO187), which permits the 
assumption that an improved internal understanding and confidence building will 
be possible due to "streamlined" conditions of communication and cognition.  
Second, the growing importance of cultural development indicates that, in 
socially and technologically highly condensed contexts of modern military 
command structures and multinational bodies of forces, adaptability and 
innovation gain will have to be necessarily reconstructed and re-organized 
completely in terms of individual and organizational interests, if they are to be 
successful regarding strategic-operational objectives.  Consequently, in order to 
be successful, transformation must always aim at the highest degree of 
synergistic effects between the existing specialized technological, structural and 
socio-cultural variables.  For the success of multinational cooperation188 with 
allies, it is evidently of growing importance as well to what level of precision the 
essential structural and intercultural parameters can be reflected and stably 
maintained.  With this "new" view of international cooperation, obsolete 
ideological patterns--leftovers from the era of the "cold war"--would be left behind 
for good and hitherto unknown chances for cultural synergy could be discovered.  
Here, the transformation concept depicted in the previous chapter serves 
as a platform and basis for reflection, providing the chance for the organizational 
orientation to undergo spiritual regeneration and to make positive use of the 
potential for performance of the individual members of the organization.  What 
this chapter intended to demonstrate here is that there are promising prospects 
and learning achievements; in practice, however, the military and political 
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leaderships are only beginning to create and implement lasting cultural 
development as a medium of improved efficiency of the overall organization.  
Based on this, the guiding questions--how transformation can be learned 
through cultural development tasks, how the relevant knowledge can be stored 
and made accessible, how knowledge management can be established and what 
communicational exchange processes could look like--were formulated. 
Hence, what is organized is no longer culture, but organizations that are in 
the process of "learning" culture; culture is therefore "in" and is an attractive label 
for all those organizations who wish to be at the "vanguard of progress" 
(according to Clausewitz) and, on the other hand, possess high connective value 
for business and economic contexts. 
Nevertheless, modesty is called for when it comes to the practical 
implementation of the idea or concept of cultural development in the context of 
transformation.  For one cannot force cultural development.  Therefore, what is 
needed en route to transformation is, above all, time; time is, however, conceded 
to an ever-increasing degree in view of today’s dynamic environments.  This 
applies not only to personnel, but also to the organization itself.  The 
transformation of the force organization is therefore primarily a target concept for 
organizations undergoing a modernization, that is, a transformation process. 
Yet, transformation would be doomed to fail if it were reduced to a fleeting, 
spontaneous and superficial project already dependent on declarations of good-
will,  networking euphoria and noble objectives of humanitarian intervention. 
Furthermore, it became evident that the involved subjective identities 
would have to harmonize different framework conditions on the one hand, and 
cognitive and social dispositions on the other hand, if "transformation" were not 
only to be calculable, but a real, factual, integral part of organizational learning.  
Again, it can be predicted that the intermediate significance of a concept 
of cultural development for the military community and also for the state will 
continuously grow.  It is at this point already that transformation has an essential 
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importance for the Bundeswehr, as it makes "learning" a central metaphor of 
adaptability and innovation.  This will undoubtedly increase its chances to 



































































At the beginning of the 21st century, neither the fears of pure high-tech 
wars conducted by automated “warfighters” nor the utopia of a world (or at least 
a Europe) without conflict have come true.  After the 11 September 2001 
assaults on the symbolic centers of US financial and military power, the 
existence of worldwide terrorist networks seems to be one of the most apparent 
political, social and cultural threats, not only to international security but also to 
individual safety. 
However, there are other dangers lurking as well.  Twenty-first-century 
conflicts cannot easily be summarized or defined under a catchphrase.  It is, 
however, possible to describe general conditions and individual cases, draw 
lessons from them in a sense valuable for the soldier, and thus infer future 
options and alternatives.  In this context, such phenomena as religion and values 
plainly loom larger today than thirty years ago as elements of cultural 
development and communication.  The discussion or evaluation of some of these 
phenomena is controversial because of the latent potential to radicalize and 
polarize all sides into the worst kind of ideological war that tends toward 
Clausewitz’s postulate of absolute war.  However, in order to face future 
requirements for transformation, one must surely be able to think about them on 
the conceptual level.189 
As far as knowledge of contemporary conflicts is concerned, the following 
can be asserted: the main reason for conflicts all over the world seems to be 
unresolved issues of power and society, often filtered through ethnic affiliation 
(i.e., ethnicity), religion and economic interests.  At any rate, ethnicity and religion 
easily lend themselves to being weaponized in the course of armed conflicts.  
Conflicts are still carried out with the help of conventional weapons, but also with 
the help of high-tech weapons and advanced technology. The proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction into irregular armed groups in conflict for all 
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encompassing ideological ends poses a threat to societies unaccustomed to 
armed conflict and through their ever greater complexity and inter-
connectedness, possibly more vulnerable to some kind of knock-out blow--
however this idea has been undermined by the record of the 20th century.   
Nonetheless, one can surely assert that the distinctions between crime, war and 
civil war are becoming blurred.  The repercussions of these conflicts directly 
threaten Europe and Germany. 
A great number of conflicts in Europe are taking place largely unnoticed 
because they are of no interest to great powers or Western media and relief 
organizations who think in economic terms.  In addition, people receive distorted 
impressions of many conflicts that are presented in the European media on 
account of propaganda/disinformation, media control and misinterpretation. 
The unexploited potential within the institution of Innere Führung requires 
reform within the ideal of transformation.  The neglect to exploit the full potential 
of Innere Fuehrung amid the transformation of the Bundeswehr has led to a 
lowering of the individual skills in multinational units that goes beyond the 
different languages. This phenomenon actually calls the purpose of 
transformation into question, creates areas of different 
perception/misunderstandings and consequently leads to a partial loss of 
efficiency on the part of the military.  Finally, the conditions in multilateral 
missions, which will become a permanent fixture, will provide a growing 
challenge for recruitment. 
Transformation processes and international units show that highly 
developed military organizations not only exert a large influence on their own 
environment and resources, but also on national problems as well as on the 
European level. To be sure, those who experience service in multi-national units 
derive more profit from it than not; in more cases than not such service allows the 
mastery of retrograde nationalist and particularist impulses and fosters a sense 
of common purpose, identity and values in those who have direct experience of 
such service.  Failure to exploit this phenomenon within the institutions of 
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education and training of the Bundeswehr has such consequences as: limitation 
of financial freedom of movement, recruitment problems, growing importance of 
language skills and the development of Euro-military identity and intercultural 
awareness.   Additional key problems include the technology and training on the 
tactical level.  
However, the more time goes by for necessary modifications of Innere 
Führung, the higher the potential for ensuing insecurity in inefficient work will be.  
It is in particular the work in multinational units of the developing and 
transforming European battlegroups that are affected by the interdependencies 
of an intercultural environment.  These new forces, which can surely draw on 
more than a half century of positive experience in the realm of  identity, 
command, leadership and morale  
In many parts of the German army, the original approach for the 
innovation of the concept Innere Führung has gone astray and requires a 
renewed emphasis.  Innere Führung cannot be merely a motivational tactic 
divorced from its more central professional purpose as a core ideal of the 
German soldier.  Moreover, one can find many misperceptions and 
misunderstandings regarding the meaning of Innere Führung190.  In this context 
the original essence of Innere Führung became debased from its original 
purpose and became its opposite.  Nevertheless amid the perils of the present 
and with the positive opportunities thrown open to European soldiers by 
transformation, Germans and Europeans may give Innere Führung and use it in 
the context of cultural development for democratization of the military in general 
and preparation of multilateral missions.   
It is expected that by 2025 multinational units will become normal even on 
the battalion level.  At present, more than half of the European armies are 
deployed with multinational units into an international environment–so far without 
any kind of focused cultural training. The lack of proper execution of the core 
ideal of leadership and command is consequently quite evident.  Particularly in 
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reference to the change of the new preconditions for the use of military, it seems 
to be highly important to improve the concept of Innere Führung in the framework 
of the transformation. 
To face the new cultural challenges, the German armed forces have to 
become more competitive with civilian companies.  Therefore expressions such 
as identity and awareness need to get more attention in the training.  In particular 
the element “intercultural awareness”, as depicted in the previous chapter, can 
profit from an intense cooperation with the civilian sector. Furthermore, central 
elements of Innere Führung are supposed to be established on the European 
level.  This can only be reached by an interinstitutional approach supported by 
the German DoD and government.  Maybe in as little as 15 years, even smaller 
European armies and non-governmental organizations or individuals/groups will 
be able to operate with a newly established “Task Force Innere Führung”. 191 
While on the one hand the European harmonization already developed by 
the foundation of different European units such as the battlegroups in particular 
offers certain financial advantages, consequently cultural differences run the risk 
of being marginalized in this process.  However, modifications have to be limited 
there where they do adjust to a lower level.  Thus, transformation–on the 
European level--does offer underdeveloped structural capabilities/assets new 
conceptual opportunities, but it also threatens the concept of Innere Führung with 
potential marginalization.  Marginalization results in instabilities that potentially 
jeopardize the process of further democratization of the existing armed forces. 
The consequences of the ensuing crises and (armed) conflicts will, for the 
reasons already mentioned, also affect the Bundeswehr. 
Fundamentalist movements vehemently resist both the successes of the 
modernizing civilization process and the real or putative threat to their own 
cultural traditions from the cultural globalization taking place in all religions and 
civilizations of the world.  In this context, the following questions arise: Which 
religious interpretations and theological paradigms allow for a legitimization of 
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violence? Which groups and persons use them? What are the historical 
circumstances under which individuals employ such legitimization patterns? The 
history of Europe in the last five hundred years, when seen in an analytical 
manner, offers many suggestions at how at least a significant part of the world 
has mastered these issues and moved from perpetual conflict to greater peace 
and prosperity without mass murder.  
The conditions under which the “dark side” of a religion appears in the 
political and social realms seem to vary.  However, it is undeniable that on 
account of the economic and social pressure prevalent in times of change, and 
increasing social polarization and discrimination, many individuals find security 
and comfort in their traditional religion.  During these times of modernization and 
change, when people are threatened with social degradation, cultural uncertainty, 
economic hopelessness and the failure of corrupt political elites, many people 
regard political fundamentalism as the only remaining solution to their existential 
problems.  In principle, religions or civilizations do not wage war against each 
other.  Rather, they are employed as a political weapon in international power 
struggles and as an instrument to mobilize the masses.  Ethnification and de 
secularization are an effective strategy and will continue to be employed again 
and again.  Therefore, the radicalization via extreme ideologies in   (armed) 
conflict to legitimize, motivate and recruit a following is also to be expected in the 
future.  This development suggests an emerging multipolar world order whose 
design, however, can on the one hand lead to the cooperation of the main 
players, but does on the other hand involve various risks of confrontation.   
In addition many minorities, especially in the eastern part of this region, 
are living under conditions that represent a considerable potential for possible 
ethnic conflicts.   
All these factors are converging in the field of cultural trends that, on 




the developed European industrial nations.  Also, in view of the events of 11 
September 2001, particular attention must be once again paid to cultural trends 
as depicted in Chapter II.192 
The beginning of the 21st century represents part of a transformation 
phase that will shape the future–for the military and the state.  The times where 
individual training was primarily focused on national conditions seem to be 
coming to an end.  Security interests can only be addressed through the further 
democratization of the military. In a multi-national context toward a certain 
supranational idea of Europe and beyond Alliances extend this democratization 
(among other things, via a political solidarity effect).  The distinction between 
national and international units and deployments seems to be becoming 
increasingly blurred and such a phenomenon represents a considerable potential 
for a positive outcome, if soldiers and defense civilians approach the task with 
the right ideas and suitable tools.  The network of relations in international policy 
will become much more complex. And those with the most at stake, that is we in 
the West, have the greatest requirement to overcome the destructive effects of 
just this change  On account of the numerous interrelations between the many 
cultural trends, particularist solutions can no longer be effective.  Therefore, there 
is an increasing need for national solutions and beyond, for example in the areas 
of Euro-military identity and intercultural awareness of the establishment of 
Innere Führung on the European level, and at the level of the international 
organizations.193 
This is why the cultural challenges that are faced in the 21st century 
represent not only the defense against risks and dangers but above all the active 
development of the existing concept of Innere Führung.  Another challenge that 
must be coped with is the new forms of leadership.   
                                                 
192 Huntington. Fundamental Islamic terrorism has become more transnational – it is no 
longer predominantly national.  
193 Global Trends 2002 (Global Trends 2002), op.  cit., p.199. 
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The second challenge, prevention of civilian conflict management194, 
involves the training and preparation for the work in multinational and first of all 
especially in European, units and headquarters. In large parts of the world, a 
development leading to the multinationalization of deployments can be observed.  
The clearly discernible trend of the last fifty years (NATO, Eurocorps, European 
battlegroups) will continue.   
In order to cope with the changes in the security-relevant environment, the 
military needs new types of forces that are characterized by a high degree of 
flexibility, learning ability and professionalism, and a leadership willing to 
question existing structures and concepts in order to promote the further 
development of the forces and to contribute to the task of shaping future security 
policy.  The military leadership must also be willing to deal with the necessity to 
develop armed forces into learning organizations implementing knowledge 
management, especially with the potential vested in Innere Fuehrung as a means 
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